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Julian Chingoma
Abstract
Legal reasoning is a method that is applied by legal practitioners to make
legal decisions. For a scenario, legal reasoning requires not only the facts
of the scenario but also the legal rules to be enforced within it. Formal
logic has long been used for reasoning tasks in many domains. Deontic logic
is a logic which is often used to formalise legal scenarios with its built-in
notions of obligation, permission and prohibition. Within the legal domain,
it is important to recognise that there are many exceptions and conflicting
obligations. This motivates the enrichment of deontic logic with not only
the notion of defeasibility, which allows for reasoning about exceptions, but
a stronger notion of typicality which is based on defeasibility. KLM-style
defeasible reasoning introduced by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM), is a
logic system that employs defeasibility while a logic that serves the same role
for the stronger notion of typicality is Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL).
Deontic paradoxes are often used to examine deontic logic systems as the
scenarios arising from the paradoxes’ structures produce undesirable results
when desirable deontic properties are applied to the scenarios. This is despite
the various scenarios themselves seeming intuitive. This dissertation shows
that KLM-style defeasible reasoning and PTL are both effective when applied
to the analysis of the deontic paradoxes. We first present the background
information which comprises propositional logic, which forms the foundation
for the other logic systems, as well as the background of KLM-style defeasible
reasoning, deontic logic and PTL. We outline the paradoxes along with their
issues within the presentation of deontic logic. We then show that for each
of the two logic systems we can intuitively translate the paradoxes, satisfy
many of the desirable deontic properties and produce reasonable solutions to
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Legal reasoning is a method used when one is given normative knowledge and
facts and must produce legal decisions based on the information presented
and the application of certain rules applied to this information [16]. We do
not limit our interest to legal reasoning, but we want to move beyond the legal
domain into the general reasoning about regulations. Logic has for a long
time been used to formalise legal norms and study legal reasoning [9]. Deontic
logic is one such field of logic which has been used to work with normative
reasoning tasks [21, 23]. The difference between “what is the case” and “what
should be the case” is fundamental to law and this naturally translates to
deontic logic with its handling of normative concepts such as obligation,
permission and prohibition. This represents the principal motivation for
investigating deontic logic, as it can intuitively formalise normative scenarios
such as:
1. It is obligatory that a person pay tax
2. John is a person
3. John did not pay tax
This is a plausible scenario in which John violated the obligation that one
must pay their taxes and it represents a breaking of the law in the actual
world. Since deontic logic can naturally represent such cases, it is worth
studying this logic when investigating legal reasoning. Research in deontic
logic often focuses on how to express scenarios using the language of a cho-
sen deontic logic variation [12]. An interest in building computing tools for
1
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regulatory decision making motivates to not merely look at the expressive
capabilities of deontic logic but also the reasoning capabilities. And generally
when performing reasoning in the actual world, we come across exceptional
cases that conflict with our usual way of thinking. This occurs in the le-
gal domain often, so we want our deontic logic to handle such occurrences.
Therefore, the focus of this research will be to find a way of introducing
a concept called defeasibility into a deontic setting. Defeasibility allows for
reasoning about exceptions in a domain, distinguishing between “what is usu-
ally the case” and “what is actually the case” [3, 4, 27]. The following is a
situation which contains an exception and we cannot reasonably deal with it
in a logic without defeasibility:
1. Students do not pay tax
2. Students who are part-time workers pay tax
3. John is a student who pays tax
This scenario provides an issue since the first two statements contradict each
other therefore John cannot exist, as a student who pays tax cannot exist
even if they are a part-time worker. This is not intuitive, as we should be able
to conclude from the three statements that John is a student who is also a
part-time worker. And that conclusion is in line with the usual reasoning that
humans employ, as some exceptions and conflicts are presented in everyday
life that require the retraction of previous conclusions. The statements of the
above example with an exception can instead, be stated as follows if using a
logic equipped with defeasibility:
1. Students usually do not pay tax
2. Students who are part-time workers usually pay tax
3. John is a student who pays tax
This is a representation that does not produce inconsistencies and can be
reasoned upon with the various reasoning algorithms available for defeasible
reasoning. The first two statements now provide the room for exceptional
situations, as is the case with John in our example. Intuitively, the above
tells us that John is a part-time worker and there is only a problem if we learn
that John, in fact, is not a part-time worker. Now we motivate the enriching
of deontic logic with this notion of defeasibility. Since deontic logic is the tool
Chapter 1 2
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of choice when looking to formalise the reasoning of laws and regulations, it
is important to note that there are already notions of defeasibility in the
world of legal reasoning. The introduction of new information/regulations
can cause laws to conflict and/or present exceptions which make existing
laws inapplicable [9]. The following is an example where such issues occur.
Assume the following statements to be true:
1. Students must not pay tax
2. Students who are part-time workers must pay tax
One can represent these obligations using deontic logic but when presented
with the fact that there is a student who works part-time and must, therefore,
pay taxes, it presents a violation of the first obligation when there intuitively
should not be. The law intuitively means that a typical student should not
pay tax while part-time working students are not typical students but are
an exception to the norm rather than a violation of the first obligation. So
it seems reasonable to desire a deontic logic with the ability to cater for
exceptions in order to reason about such normative scenarios.
1.1 Research Objectives
This section aims to give a broad outline of the research objectives with-
out delving into significant detail. First, we look to determine how effective
defeasibility is when applied in a deontic environment. This will start by
investigating the extent to which the deontic statements can be represented
using the following logic system. The logic often referred to as KLM-style
defeasible reasoning is the logic which represents defeasibility, which we will
look at during the dissertation [4, 7, 13]. We will begin by looking at how
we can represent deontic statements using KLM-style defeasible reasoning.
With this approach comes two well-established reasoning methods, so we aim
to investigate the extent to which they are useful in a deontic environment.
Beyond defeasibility, we are also interested in the stronger notion of typical-
ity. Typicality is based on defeasibility and is a notion used in Propositional
Typicality Logic (PTL), where its extra expressive power makes it a more
powerful version of the defeasibility presented by KLM-style defeasible rea-
soning [1].
The first part, dealing with the KLM approach, will inform us on whether
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it is worth examining the introduction of typicality into a deontic environ-
ment. This examination of PTL’s suitability in a deontic setting will require
looking at some of the following issues. Is there an intuitive way to repre-
sent deontic statements using the language of PTL? Similarly to defeasible
reasoning, PTL has multiple reasoning methods which can be investigated.
The two different PTL reasoning methods seem to produce reasonable con-
clusions for given PTL statements, but neither has been tested in specific
domains such as the one of legal reasoning. We ask if either of the PTL en-
tailment methods produce reasonable conclusions when applied to the realm
of deontic reasoning.
1.2 Dissertation outline
This dissertation can be logically split into two parts. The first largely deals
with presenting the background information required to conduct the analysis
that is found in the second part. Chapter 2 introduces propositional logic
as this forms the foundation of the various logic systems we analyse in the
research. This chapter outlines the propositional language and thereafter,
the notion of valuations is introduced as this is a key part of the semantics
of our logic systems of interest. Chapter 3 presents the KLM-style defeasible
reasoning approach. This is a logic which extends propositional logic with
the introduction of an operator to represent defeasibility. Its language is
briefly described and subsequently, properties are given which tell us what
we can conclude from the sets of KLM-style statements. The chapter will end
with the presentation of the KLM semantics and two reasoning methods that
can be used when dealing with KLM-style statements. Chapter 4 presents
a specific deontic logic system which is also an enrichment of propositional
logic, with the inclusion of an operator to represent obligations. Its language
is briefly described, and its semantics are presented thereafter. We then
detail some deontic properties which are generally deemed to be desirable
and then discuss some of the famous deontic paradoxes which have interested
researchers in the field. Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) is then detailed
in chapter 5 in a similar fashion to the previous logic systems. Once again,
there is a brief description of the language as PTL also has propositional
logic as its foundation along with the addition of a typicality operator. The
semantics for PTL are presented and two of the PTL reasoning methods are
given. Chapter 6 will outline the research processes we employed and after
Chapter 1 4
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this chapter is where the dissertation transitions into the analysis part. The
use of KLM-style defeasibility on deontic scenarios is explored in chapter 7.
We first show how we chose to represent deontic scenarios using KLM-style
statements and proceed to investigate what we can conclude when using this
logic system on the deontic paradoxes. Chapters 8 and 9 each lay out the
analysis of one of PTL’s two reasoning methods in a similar vein to chapter
7. In chapter 8, how deontic statements will be formally represented using
PTL will be detailed first. We then examine what we can derive using the
one reasoning method. Chapter 9, on the other hand, will jump straight
to the analysis of the conclusions, as the representation from chapter 8 is
carried over into this chapter. The reasons for this are communicated at the
beginning of chapter 9. In the final chapter of the dissertation, chapter 10,
we present our conclusions. This chapter is where we briefly restate the work
of the dissertation, consolidate the results from the prior three chapters and
come to a final determination on the effectiveness of the various approaches.




This chapter serves to present propositional logic, the logical foundation of
the three logic systems which we examine during this dissertation. Propo-
sitional logic is utilised to formalise statements that can considered to be
either true or false, and is used to study the logical relationships between
these statements [12]. The formal language, which is presented below, con-
sists of propositional letters along with operators and constants which can be
used to form propositional formulas. These formulas are what formally repre-
sent the statements that are to be studied. The propositional logic semantics,
which give the formal meaning for the given statements, are also shown and
the important notions of satisfaction and entailment in propositional logic
are also defined.
2.1 Language
We now specify the language of propositional logic which determines the type
of statements that can be formulated using propositional logic.
Definition 2.1. The propositional language L is formed by a set of proposi-
tional letters  , such as p,q and r, together with the following operators and
constants [6, 12, 25]: {¬,^,_,!,$,?,>}.
These operators and constants can be used with the propositional let-
ters to recursively build propositional formulas. These formulas are usually
denoted by ↵,  ,  ,etc. The following are examples of some propositional for-
mulas that can be created, where ↵ = p and   = q: {↵,  ,¬↵,↵^ ,↵_ ,↵ !
 ,↵ $  ,↵ ! ?,> !  }.
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Propositional letters such as p and q can represent any proposition and
for this example, they can be read as “John is a student” and “John pays
tax” respectively. The operators and constants of L are now given in further
detail.
• ¬ | this is an operator which represents negation, so ¬p is read as “not
p” or “John is not a student”.
• ^ | this is an operator which represents conjunction, so p^ q is read as
“p and q” or “John is a student and John pays tax”.
• _ | this is an operator which represents disjunction, so p _ q is read as
“p or q” or “John is a student or John pays tax”.
• !| this is an operator used to represent implication and what logically
follows from a premise. p ! ¬q would translate to “p implies ¬q” or
“If John is a student then John does not pay tax”.
• $| this is an operator used to represent the double implication/“if and
only if”. p $ ¬q would translate to “p implies ¬q and ¬q implies p” or
“John is a student if and only if John does not pay tax”.
• ? | this is a constant which represents a contradiction. This can be
thought of as “p is true and p is false”/p ^ ¬p, which cannot be true.
This could be represented as the statement “John is a student and John
is not a student”.
• > | this constant which represents tautology or absolute truth. This is
the opposite of ? and can be represented by “p is true or p is false”/p_
¬p, which is always true. This could be represented as the statement
“John is a student or John is not a student”.
Since the reasoning aspect is of interest to us, it is important to detail the
notion of entailment, with entailment being the concept of what conclusions
logically follow from a set of premises [1]. The classical way to do this in
propositional logic is to look at the truth assignments of the propositional
letters, usually denoted using valuations. A valuation is an assignment of
either true or false to each propositional letter. For example, the valuation
{p, q} states that both p and q are true while {p,¬q} is a valuation where p
is true and q is false.
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2.2 Semantics
With the language defined, we now detail the propositional logic semantics.
The semantics tell us what we can conclude about the truth of a propositional
formula.
Definition 2.2. Let W denote the set of all possible valuations. The no-
tion of satisfaction of a propositional formula is commonly denoted using |=.
Given a valuation s 2 W , a propositional letter p and propositional formulas
↵ and  , we can define satisfaction in the propositional language as follows
[6, 22, 25]:
• s |= p iff p is true in the valuation s
• s |= ¬↵ iff not s |= ↵, as in ↵ is false in s
• s |= ↵ ^   iff s |= ↵ and s |=  , as in ↵ and   are both true in s
• s |= ↵ _   iff s |= ↵ or s |=  , as in at least one of ↵ and   hold in s
• s |= ↵ !   iff s |= ¬↵ _  , as in at least one of ¬↵ and   hold in s
• s |= ↵ $   iff s |= ↵ !   and s |=   ! ↵
This satisfaction definition can be applied to any propositional formula
formed by the propositional letters, operators and constants. A knowledge
base is a set of statements that represent information about some domain.
A classical knowledge base, let’s say KB, is a set of propositional formulas of
the propositional logic language. Classical entailment tells us what logically
follows from a knowledge base and classical entailment relies upon the above
concept of satisfaction of propositional formulas. If all the valuations that
model a knowledge base KB, which refers to satisfying all the formulas in
KB, also satisfy a formula, let’s say ↵, then we say that KB entails ↵. This
is given in the following definitions.
Definition 2.3. We say that a valuation, let’s say s 2 W , satisfies a knowl-
edge base KB, s |= KB, if and only if s |= ↵ for every propositional formula
↵ 2 KB.
Definition 2.4. Let KB be a knowledge base and ↵ be a propositional for-
mula. We say that KB entails ↵, KB |= ↵, if and only if for every s 2 W
such that s |= KB, we have that s |= ↵.
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As seen in definition 2.4, the |= symbol is not only used to denote sat-
isfaction but is also employed to represent classical entailment, which is en-
tailment from a classical knowledge base. Again, we denote the entailment
of a propositional formula ↵ from KB as KB |= ↵, so for an example formula
p ! q, KB |= p ! q asserts that we can derive p ! q from a knowledge
base KB. For the statement p ! q to follow from a knowledge base, then
we check for every valuation that satisfies the knowledge base, if we have
that p is true in such a valuation then q must also be true in that valuation.
Another way to think about these valuations is when we have statements
that we know to be true and must determine which valuations satisfy these
statements. So for example, let’s take the propositional letters p and q, and
we have the valuation {p,¬q}. We are able to conclude that the valuation




This chapter presents the KLM approach to defeasible reasoning. We begin
by introducing the language and semantics of this logic system. We then
outline some properties which inform us about the entailment of some of the
KLM approach’s reasoning methods. Two of these reasoning methods are
then outlined with their differences briefly discussed. We also present their
two respective algorithms which can be used to perform the reasoning tasks.
3.1 KLM approach
The first logic we investigate is an enrichment of propositional logic and is a
form of non-monotonic reasoning, which is a form of reasoning that allows for
conclusions to be retracted. The property of monotonicity is one that clas-
sical logic systems satisfy which states that the addition of new information
strictly leads to more conclusions. This does not align with the usual human
thinking which better handles exceptions. The use of this non-monotonic
reasoning system allows us to reason defeasibly. This logic system is the
KLM approach to defeasible reasoning. It is a logic that was proposed by
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, hence the name KLM [13]. Before looking
at the KLM-style defeasible reasoning in detail, it is important to acknowl-
edge that this is not the only option to perform defeasible reasoning. Other
approaches include circumscription, default logic and auto-epistemic logic
[18, 19, 24]. Since there are other non-monotonic reasoning approaches, it
seems reasonable to justify the use of the KLM approach.
The first benefit to using the KLM approach is that it is systematic. This
10
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tells us that it has set, formal requirements that are to be satisfied for the
system to produce intuitively reasonable results when dealing with non-
monotonic reasoning scenarios [15]. We will see this with the properties
that are detailed later in this chapter. Another factor considered is that
the computational complexity of the system measures well in comparison to
other non-monotonic approaches [3], this refers particularly to the reasoning
methods. There is also the added benefit that the process of reasoning with
the system is automatic and therefore does not require considerable input
from users. This contrasts some other approaches which require much more
user-involvement at various stages. Lastly, this approach can be reduced
to classical reasoning which means that we can use well-established meth-
ods and software tools for reasoning scenarios [2, 3]. All these mentioned
benefits would be especially helpful for an individual building software tools
for defeasible reasoning. We now proceed to define the formal language and
ranked-interpretation semantics of the KLM approach.
3.2 Language
The following is the definition of the language of KLM-style defeasible rea-
soning. The KLM approach’s language is an enrichment of the propositional
logic language.
Definition 3.1. The language of KLM-style defeasible reasoning is formed by
a set of propositional letters  , the operators and constants of propositional
logic with the addition of the following defeasible implication operator, |⇠.
Thus the KLM approach’s language is an enrichment of the propositional
logic language with defeasible implications of the form ↵ |⇠   where ↵ and  
are propositional formulas.
The defeasible implication operator |⇠ is the defeasible version of the
classical implication !. Defeasible implications represent implications that
we can potentially reject in exceptional circumstances and are read as “↵
typically implies  ” as opposed to statements made with the classical impli-
cation.
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3.3 Semantics
With the language for the KLM approach defined, we proceed to detail the
semantics. The semantics for the KLM approach are defined in terms of
ranked interpretations.
Definition 3.2. A ranked interpretation, R, is a set of valuations, let’s
say V ✓ W where W denotes the set of all possible valuations, along with
a binary relation  where the valuations are ranked with some valuations
being preferred to others.  is a modular order and holds the properties of
reflexivity, transitivity and anti-symmetry. Since we have anti-symmetry then
valuations that are of the same rank or level of preference are incomparable.
Incomparability states that if the valuations, let’s say v and w, are of the
same rank/level, then we have neither v  w or w  v. Given a ranked
interpretation R and a formula ↵, the set of valuations that satisfy ↵ are
represented as J↵KR, where J↵KR = {v 2 V | v |= ↵} [1, 13]. We say that a
defeasible implication, let’s say ↵ |⇠  , is satisfied in a ranked interpretation
if the minimal valuations where ↵ is true are valuations where   is true,
minJ↵KR ✓ J KR [1, 13, 15]. That is to say that given J↵KR, 8 v0 2 V , if
v0 2 {v 2 J↵KR : @w 2 J↵KR , such that w < v}, then v0 |=  .
3.4 Properties of rational defeasible entailment
relation
We now present the defeasible counterpart to the classical entailment relation
that we have seen previously, |=. We will use this defeasible entailment
relation to denote what we can derive from a defeasible knowledge base.
Definition 3.3. A defeasible knowledge base is a set which includes classical
propositional logic formulas, such as ¬↵, ↵ _   and ↵ !  , along with
defeasible implications such as ↵ |⇠  .
Defeasible entailment will be denoted using the relation |⇡ and for exam-
ple, a statement such as KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠   tells us that ↵ |⇠   defeasibly follows
from the knowledge base. Below is a list of properties that the defeasible
entailment relation, |⇡, ought to satisfy in order to be considered rational.
These properties are to be interpreted as if we have a defeasible knowledge
base, KB, which makes use of propositional formulas such as ↵,   and  .
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The following is the derivation of one of these properties, the Left Logical
Equivalence property. This derivation also serves as an example to illustrate
the structure of the remaining property derivations. The general form of the
derivations will be as follows. The premises will appear first and these will
tell us what the knowledge base currently entails, either classically or defea-
sibly. Then if there is a separating line, then what is below that line will be
what logically follows from the premises.
|= ↵ $  ,KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
KB |⇡   |⇠  
The above derivation tells us that given a defeasible knowledge base KB, we
have that ↵ $   is a tautology and ↵ |⇠   follows from KB. The Left Logical
Equivalence property states that   |⇠   logically follows from the knowledge
base. We now give a representative example to demonstrate the intuition of
the property. If we have that “being a student is equivalent to being a young
person” and “being a student usually implies having a student card” then is
it reasonable to derive that “being a young person usually implies having a
student card”. Similarly, illustrative examples will be given for the remain-
ing properties as they are detailed. The following is a list of the remaining
properties along with a brief example to illustrate their intuition.
Reflexivity KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠ ↵
This tells us that ↵ |⇠ ↵ follows from the knowledge base and this applies for
every propositional formula in KB. We could read this as "being a student




If we have that both ↵ |⇠   and ↵ ^   |⇠   follow from the knowledge
base, this property tells us that we can derive ↵ |⇠   from the knowledge
base. If we have that “being a lecturer usually implies being a staff member”
and we also have that “being a lecturer and being a staff member usually im-
plies having a staff number” then we should be able to derive “being a lecturer
usually implies having a staff number”.
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If have that both ↵ |⇠   and ↵ |⇠   follow from the knowledge base, this
property tells us that we can conclude that ↵ |⇠   ^   follows from the
knowledge base. If we have for example that “being a student usually implies
having a student card” and also have “being a student usually implies paying
the fees in full” then we would want it to be the case that “being a student




If we have that both ↵ |⇠   and   |⇠   follow from the knowledge base,
this property tells us that we can conclude that ↵ _   |⇠   follows from the
knowledge base. If we have that “being a student entering the library usually
implies having a student card” and we also have “being a student entering the
computer lab usually implies having a student card” then we should be able
to derive “being a student entering the library or being a student entering the




If we have   !   as a tautology and that ↵ |⇠   follows from the knowledge
base, this property tells us that we can conclude that ↵ |⇠   follows from the
knowledge base. If we have for example that “being a student implies having
a student card” and “paying the fess in full usually implies being a student”





If we have that both ↵ |⇠   and ↵ |⇠   follow from the knowledge base,
this property tells us that we can conclude that ↵ ^   |⇠   follows from the
knowledge base. If we have for example that “being a student usually implies
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having a student card” and also have “being a student usually implies paying
the fees in full” then we would want it to be the case that “being a student




If we have that ↵ |⇠   follows from the knowledge base and also have that
↵ |⇠ ¬  does not follow from the knowledge base, this property tells us that
we can conclude that ↵^   |⇠   follows from the knowledge base. If we have
for example that “being a student usually implies having a student card” and
also have “being a student does not usually imply not paying the fees in full”
then we would want it to be the case that “being a student and paying the
fees in full usually implies having a student card”.
An entailment relation that satisfies all the above properties is called
a rational entailment relation. The semantics of these rational entailment
relations of the KLM approach is defined by ranked interpretations [15].
3.5 Rational Closure
Rational closure is the first of two KLM reasoning methods that we exam-
ine. The rational closure algorithm will construct a ranking where every
formula has a rank. Determining the rank of a formula requires one to look
at how exceptional it is and will require the definition of
 !KB which is the
materialisation set of the knowledge base KB. A materialisation being the
converting of defeasible implications into classical implications so we have !KB = {↵ !   | ↵ |⇠   2 KB}. A formula ↵ is exceptional in a defeasible
knowledge base, let’s say, KB if and only if  !KB |= ¬↵ [7, 15]. This tells us
that the negation of the formula is classically entailed by the materialisation
set. And a defeasible implication is exceptional if its antecedent is excep-
tional with respect to KB. For example, ↵ |⇠   is exceptional in KB if ↵ is
exceptional in KB. To determine the degree to which a defeasible implication
is exceptional, we construct a non-increasing sequence of exceptional subsets
of KB. We say that E(KB) is a set of the exceptional defeasible implications
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of KB [7, 15]. Now, we consider a sequence of subsets of KB, Ci for i > 0,
where C0 = KB, and Ci = E(Ci 1). For a KB, there is an n   0 such that
Cn = ; or for all m > n, Cm = Cn. We then say that the rank of a formula,
let’s say ↵, will be the smallest natural number, i, in the subset sequence such
that ↵ is not exceptional. If the formula is exceptional for all the subsets in
the sequence then it has infinite rank and also note that classical statements
are also given an infinite rank. The steps for the rational closure algorithm
are now listed.
Step 1 Firstly, obtain a ranking for the knowledge base’s materialisation
set,
 !KB, based on exceptionality. (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n) will be the ordered
tuple which represents the rankings.
Step 2 If we now ask if the defeasible implication ↵ |⇠   can be derived
by the knowledge base. We must first check if ¬↵ can be derived from the
rankings (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n).
Step 3 If ¬↵ is derivable than the group of the least exceptional defeasible
implications will be removed from the ranking and no longer be considered.
We then return to step 2. If ¬↵ cannot be derived then proceed to step 4.
Step 4 Once ¬↵ is no longer derivable from the rankings, then we can check
if ↵ !   is derivable from the rankings.
To present the rational closure algorithm, we will use an example to better
illustrate the steps taken. we take a set {b |⇠ f, b |⇠ w, p |⇠ ¬f, p ! b, r ! b}
where p is a “penguin”, b is a “bird”, r is a “robin”, f is “to fly” and w is “has
wings”. The knowledge base classically entails ¬p because we have that “birds
usually fly”, “penguins do not usually fly” and “penguins are birds”. The log-
ical consequence of this is that there are no penguins since the existence of
penguins will cause a conflict. Since the materialisation of this set classically
entails ¬p, we have that p |⇠ ¬f is exceptional. It is the only exceptional
formula therefore it moves to a different level to the other defeasible impli-
cations. This gives us the following ranking, shown in the table, which is
equivalent to (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n). The algorithm to build the ranking using
exceptionality is also formally presented on the next page.
1 p ! b, r ! b
1 p ! ¬f
0 b ! f ,b ! w
Now we will go through the following steps if we want to check if a defeasible
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formula, let’s say r |⇠ w, is in the rational closure. We must then check if ¬r
is derivable from the classical version of the rankings. ¬r is not derivable in
this example so we can continue. If ¬r was derivable then we would remove
the top layer from the ranking and continue this process until we no longer
derive ¬r. Once that is complete, then we can now check if r ! w can be
classically entailed from the statements that remain in the above ranking. In
this case, they do, so we derive r |⇠ w.
Algorithm 1: Ranking
Input: KB
Output: An ordered tuple (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n)
1 i := 0;
2 E0 :=
 !KB;
3 while Ei 1 6= Ei do
4 Ei+1 := {↵ !   2 Ei | Ei |= ¬↵};
5 Ri := Ei \ Ei+1;
6 i := i+ 1;
7 R1 := Ei 1;
8 if Ei 1 = ; then
9 n := i  1;
10 else
11 n := i;
12 return (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n)
If we were to ask whether penguins have wings in this example, we would
see that rational closure cannot derive p |⇠ w. For the case with p |⇠ w,
¬p is true when first checked on the above classical ranking. Therefore the
least exceptional layer, {b ! f, b ! w}, must be removed and rids the
model of the statement b ! w. Without this statement we can only tell that
penguins are birds but have no indication on whether birds have wings and
there is therefore no way to derive that penguins have wings. This is because
rational closure employs a prototypical reading. Using rational closure we
cannot conclude that penguins have wings because it does not represent a
typical bird and therefore cannot inherit any properties of the group it is a
subclass of (penguin is a subclass of bird) [4]. Rational closure is said to be
a conservative form of entailment since it is unable to derive some intuitive
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conclusions [1]. Now to formally present the rational closure algorithm which
incorporates the ranking algorithm.
Algorithm 2: RationalClosure
Input: KB and ↵ |⇠  
Output: true, if KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠  , and false otherwise
1 (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n) := Ranking(KB);




4 while R1 [R |= ¬↵ and R 6= ; do
5 R := R \Ri;
6 i := i+ 1;
7 return R1 [R |= ↵ !  ;
3.6 Lexicographic Closure
Lehmann detailed another form of entailment for defeasible reasoning called
lexicographic closure [14]. The following are some of the properties that,
along with properties that rational closure supports, guided the construction
of lexicographic closure as stated by Lehmann [14].
Presumption of typicality tells us that if we have ↵ |⇠   then we can ei-
ther accept ↵ ^   |⇠   or ↵ |⇠ ¬ . This property tells that we only accept
↵ |⇠ ¬  when we have concrete evidence to do so, otherwise, we presume
the former. This property essentially tells us to assume the aforementioned
property of monotonicity unless we are explicitly given information to the
contrary. Presumption of independence states that if we have two conse-
quents that result in the presumption of typicality being unable to choose
which one to accept then the presumption of independence informs which to
accept. This property broadly says to presume typicality for every conse-
quent unless there is a reason for the contrary. For the previous example if
we have ↵ |⇠   and ↵ |⇠ ¬  then we cannot use the presumption of typicality
to derive ↵^   |⇠   but the presumption of independence tells us that   and
  are independent unless otherwise stated so this supports the derivation
of ↵ ^   |⇠  . Priority to typicality tells us to prefer inferences from the
presumption of typicality over derivations from the presumption of indepen-
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dence. Respect for specificity is a property that is also satisfied by rational
closure and is now mentioned to be thorough. For this property, any two
conflicting statements can be resolved using a preference for the statement
with the more specific antecedent. This selection between the statements
would be based more on intuition than any formal guideline.
Now to revisit the Bird example from section 3.5. We were unable to derive
p |⇠ w from {b |⇠ f, b |⇠ w, p |⇠ ¬f, p ! b, r ! b} using rational closure
but we show that we can derive p |⇠ w using lexicographic closure. The
following are the summarised steps of a lexicographic closure algorithm for
propositional logic by Casini et al., which was generalised to be implemented
on description logics [4]. We will make use of the Bird example to illustrate
the process more clearly. Firstly, we will separate the knowledge base into
A = {p ! b, r ! b} and B = {b |⇠ f, b |⇠ w, p |⇠ ¬f}, which are the
classical and defeasible parts of the knowledge base respectively. We use A
and B along with the entire knowledge base, KB, in various parts of the
algorithm. When we refer to the premises, we are referring to the antecedent
of the defeasible statement which we query. So if we were to query whether
p |⇠ w is derived by lexicographic closure then p would be the premise.
Step 1 We create a set of materialisations of the statements in the knowl-
edge base. This set of materialisations will be
 !KB. We must then check
the consistency of the knowledge base using the materialisations set. If a
knowledge base is inconsistent then anything will follow from it and which is
not desired when reasoning. A knowledge base KB is then inconsistent if and
only if
 !KB |= ?. So  !KB in the Bird example is {p ! b, r ! b, b ! f, b !
w, p ! ¬f}. This set is consistent,  !KB 6|= ?, therefore we can continue with
the algorithm. This is the case in this example despite the presence of the
three statements p ! b, b ! f and p ! ¬f because we can have a situation
where there no penguins and thus have no conflicts.
Step 2 We then give each statement in B a rank based on their exceptionality,
which is similar to what done was in section 3.5. The ranks of the example’s
statements are as follows: {r(b |⇠ f) = 0, r(b |⇠ w) = 0, r(p |⇠ ¬f) = 1}.
The ranks for the statements in A will be infinite and for the example we
have that r(p ! b) = 1 and r(r ! b) = 1.
Step 3 We define the set B̃ to be {↵ |⇠   2 B | r(↵ |⇠  ) < 1}. So B̃ will
be all the defeasible implications in B0 with a rank less than infinity. The
rank of B̃, denoted by r(B̃), will be the highest rank among the defeasible
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implications. The example’s B̃ will be {b |⇠ f, b |⇠ w, p |⇠ ¬f} and r(B̃) = 1..
Step 4 We will now define T , which will be the set of the most preferred
subsets of X , where X = {↵ !   | ↵ |⇠   2 B̃}, which satisfy both our
premises and A. Take k to be the rank of B̃ and define the subset X i as
the subset of conditionals in X which have rank i. So we can now give every
subset D of X a sequence of natural numbers with each number representing
the number of statements in that subset that have a certain rank. For the se-
quence, <n0, ..., nk>D, the numbers are generally defined as ni =| D\X k i |.
It is with these sequences of numbers that we rank the subsets, where the
number of statements they satisfy is important as well as the exceptional-
ity of the statements they satisfy. We can say that a subset D is preferred
to E iff <n0, ..., nk>D > <n0, ..., nk>E . And we say that <n0, ..., nk>  
<m0, ...,mk> iff (i) for every i, such that 0  i  k, ni   mi or (ii) if
ni < mi, then there is a j such that j < i and nj > mj.
So now to define the set T for our example. We list the subsets of X along
with their natural number sequence where r(B̃) = 1.
• {b ! f, b ! w, p ! ¬f} |< 1, 2 >
• {b ! f, b ! w} |< 0, 2 >
• {b ! f, p ! ¬f} |< 1, 1 >
• {b ! w, p ! ¬f} |< 1, 1 >
• {b ! f} |< 0, 1 >
• {b ! w} |< 0, 1 >
• {p ! ¬f} |< 1, 0 >
So for premise p and A = {p ! b, r ! b}, T will be {{b ! w, p ! ¬f}}.
Step 5 Finally, given a set of premises, p, we say p |⇠ w is in the lexicographic
closure if p[A[D |= w for every D 2 T . So if we take p to be the premise,
we can see that p |⇠ w is in the lexicographic closure and this can be denoted
by p |⇠lcKB w.
{p} [ {b ! w, p ! ¬f} [ {p ! b, r ! b} |= w
Note that the statements derived by rational closure will always be in the
lexicographic closure, therefore, lexicographic closure can be thought of as
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the more venturous of the two entailment methods [1, 4, 14]. Lexicographic
closure offers a different interpretation to rational closure for defeasible sce-
narios. As previously mentioned, with a prototypical reading, the statement
b |⇠ w tells us that typical birds have wings and this is what we get with
rational closure. This means that if we have an atypical bird then we can-
not conclude that the bird has wings. An example being penguins, atypical
birds in that they do not fly, which the rational closure algorithm states do
not have wings. The reading with lexicographic closure is a presumptive
one. The presumptive reading of b |⇠ w presumes that birds have wings
unless we are provided evidence to the contrary. This is the case even if we
have an atypical bird such as a penguin. And we have seen already that
the lexicographic closure algorithm gives us that penguins have wings. The
lexicographic closure algorithm is presented formally and also makes use of
the ranking algorithm presented in section 3.5.
Algorithm 3: LexicographicClosure
Input: KB and ↵ |⇠  
Output: true, if ↵ |⇠lcKB  , and false otherwise
1 if
 !KB |= ? then
2 return false
3 A = {↵ !   2 KB};
4 B = {↵ |⇠   2 KB};
5 (R0, ..., Rn 1, R1, n) := Ranking(KB);
6 B̃ = {↵ |⇠   2 B | r(↵ |⇠  ) < 1};
7 X = {↵ !   | ↵ |⇠   2 B̃};
8 r(B) = max{{r(a |⇠  ) | ↵ |⇠   2 B}};
9 8D 2 X assign < n0, ..., nk >D, where ni =| D \ X k i | with k = r(B̃);
10  X iff (i) 8i, s.t. 0  i  k, ni   mi or (ii) if ni < mi, then there is a j
such that j < i and nj > mj;
11 T = {D ✓ X | 8E ✓ X ,D  X E};




This chapter will formally present deontic logic in general and the specific
logic system we will investigate. Deontic Logic is a field of logic which for-
malises normative concepts. These concepts include obligation (“what is an
individual’s duty”, “what an individual ought to do”), permission (“what an
individual may do”) as well as other related concepts such as prohibition
(“what an individual is forbidden from doing”) [11, 22, 23]. The system we
will work with is the traditional Dyadic Standard Deontic Logic (DSDL)
approach [21, 22, 23], although there are alternative approaches to deontic
logic such as input/output logic [11, 17]. The reason we opted for the more
traditional approach was that it has semantics based on valuations, similar
to that of the other logic systems we deal with [21, 23]. This ensures a con-
nection between the logic systems which we can leverage to get results during
analysis. With DSDL extending the standard deontic system aptly named
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) [21, 22, 23], we will briefly present SDL. We
represent the previously mentioned normative concepts in SDL using the no-
tation:  p to say that “p is obligatory”, Pp to say that “p is permitted”
and Fp to say that “p is forbidden”. Dyadic Standard Deontic Logic (DSDL)
is then a form of deontic logic which better handles conditional obligations
such as “if p is true then you must do q”. We can represent such statements
using the “|” notation which is usually seen in conditional probability. The
example statement, “if p is true then you must do q”, would be represented by
 (q | p) in DSDL. Since many legal statements are of the conditional form,
we use DSDL as the logic when we are dealing in the deontic environment
instead of SDL.
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4.1 Language
Definition 4.1. Given a set of propositional letters  , the language of DSDL
can be formed with the following operator added to the propositional logic
language [22, 23]:   is the operator added which represents obligation as
previously mentioned. This operator can be used similarly to the negation
operator ¬ in that we can place it in front of any propositional formula and
we can also apply it in a nested fashion such as in the following example
DSDL formula  (p | q ^ (r | p)) [22].
The notion of permission being related to obligation by Pp = ¬ ¬p and
that of prohibition being similarly related by Fp =  ¬p. We can write non-
conditional obligations as conditional ones by  p =  (p| >) [23]. We can
now formally define the preference-based semantics for DSDL which were
presented with similar formal definitions by Parent et al. [22] and Pigozzi et
al. [23].
4.2 Semantics
These semantics are similar to the ranked-interpretation semantics of KLM
defeasible reasoning.
Definition 4.2. We have preference models defined as M = (V,) where
V ✓ W , with W being a non-empty set of possible valuations.  is not
only a binary relation over V but a total preorder as it is reflexive, transitive
and connected. Connectivity states that 8 v, w 2 V , then either v  w or
w  v or both. The operator |= represents the satisfaction of a formula.
Let’s say we have a valuation s 2 V as well as propositional formulas ↵ and
 . Satisfaction is done in the classical way of propositional logic with the
addition of the following [22]:
• s |=  (  | ↵) iff 8 s0 2 V , if s0 2 {s 2 J↵K : s  t, 8 t 2 J↵K}, then
s0 |=  . Here J↵K = {s 2 V : s |= ↵}. s < s0 means that s  s0 and
s0 ⇥ s. This means that given ↵ being true then only if the “best” or
“most typical” valuations that satisfy ↵ also satisfy   then we can derive
 (  | ↵) and therefore say   is obligatory given ↵. This is similar to
the model semantics of the KLM-style defeasible implications as stated
in chapter 3. Note that there are other possible definitions of “best”
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valuations, such as the one provided by Hansson [10]. For the KLM
approach, we say that a defeasible implication ↵ |⇠   is true if the
minimal or ‘best’ valuations that satisfy ↵ also satisfy  .
Note that we will not allow for duplicate valuations, i.e for all v1, v2 2 W
such that v1 6= v2, then there is a propositional formula, let’s say ↵, such that
v1 |= ↵ and v2 6|= ↵. This is a definition similar to that used by Van der Torre
when discussing the two-phase deontic logic [27]. This is necessary to prevent
a scenario, let’s say we have valuations v1, v2 and v3 with v! < v2 < v3, where
we wish to have v2 preferred to v3 but then have a v1 which is a duplicate of
v3 and is preferred to both v2 and v3.
4.3 Deontic Properties
The following outlines some properties that commonly occur in the deontic
logic literature [8, 21, 23, 27]. We chose these properties because they were
seen as being important or at least relevant when assessing the usefulness of
a deontic logic system. Thus they should be thought of as properties that
an ideal deontic logic system would have. We give justification along with
each property to show why one may want such a property in a deontic logic
system. We present these justifications primarily in the form of examples
that we intend to demonstrate the intuition behind selecting the property.
Note that this is not a full list of properties that are desirable for a deontic
logic nor are they necessary properties for a reasonable deontic system. In
that regard, this list of properties is different to that for the rationality of
the entailment relation, |⇡, in chapter 3 as the non-satisfaction of any these
properties by a deontic system, does not necessarily mean that the deontic
system will be less effective whereas the rationality of an entailment rela-
tion relies on the satisfaction of those properties in chapter 3. These deontic
properties are those we deemed desirable, but interpretations of each prop-
erty’s appropriateness within a deontic setting may differ from ours. Despite
this difference, we will re-use the entailment relation operator, |⇡, to denote
deontic derivations to form a connection between DSDL and the KLM ap-
proach. KB in these derivations will refer to a deontic knowledge base which
is a knowledge base which can contain deontic formulas in addition to those
of propositional logic. As usual, |= is used to represent classical entailment.
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Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
KB|⇡ ( |↵)
KB|⇡ ( |↵^ )
Let’s say we have the obligation to do   when ↵ is true. It is intuitive
that a more specific version of ↵ being true would still make   obligatory
since ↵ will remain to be true if a more specific version of it is true. Here
↵ ^   is a more specific version of ↵. If we have that “if you are a student
then you must have a student card” then we should be able to derive that “if
you are a student and a male then you must have a student card”. Note that
the restricted version of the property that we refer to requires the formula
↵ ^  , of the obligation  (  |   ^ ↵) that we derive, to be consistent. The
property will be referred to as Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
during this dissertation. In general, we do not desire Strengthening of the
Antecedent since we wish for obligations to be defeasible [22]. We instead
check whether there are certain conditions where we can apply it in a similar





If we have an obligation to do a task   when ↵ is satisfied, once we have
that ↵ has occurred then it is intuitive that we are now obligated to do  . If
we have that “if you are a student then you must have a student card” and
are presented with the fact that “you are a student” then we should be able




If we have an obligation to do a task   when ↵ is satisfied and we have
that ↵ is obligated to be true then it is intuitive that we are now obligated
to do  . If we have that “if you are a student then you must have a student
card” and we also have that “you have to be a student” then we should be




Let’s say we have an obligation to do a task   when ↵ is satisfied. Then
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we also have an obligation to do   when   is satisfied. By combining these
two obligations, it is intuitive that we are now obligated to do   if we have
↵. If we have that “if you are a lecturer then you must be a staff member”
and we also have that “if you are a staff member then you must have a staff
number” then we should be able to derive “if you are a lecturer then you must




Let’s say we have an obligation to do a task   when ↵ is satisfied. Then
we also have an obligation to do the same   when   is satisfied. By com-
bining these two obligations it is intuitive that we are now obligated to do  
when we have either ↵ or  . If we have that “if you are a student trying to
enter the library then you must have a student card” and we also have “if you
are a student trying to enter the computer lab then you must have a student
card” then we should be able to derive “if you are a student trying to enter





Let’s say we have an obligation to do a task   when ↵ is satisfied and we
also have an obligation to do   when ↵ is satisfied. By combining these two
obligations it is intuitive that we are now obligated to do both   and   if
when we have ↵. If we have, for example, that “if you are a student then you
must have a student card” and also have “if you are a student then your fees
must be paid in full” then we would want it to be the case that “if you are a




Note that   ^   implies  . Let’s say that we have the obligation to do
both   and   when ↵ is true. It is intuitive that we can derive an obligation
to do only one of   or   when ↵ is satisfied. If we have, for example, that “if
you are a student then you must have a student card and have your fees paid
for” then we should be able to derive “if you are a student then you must
have a student card”.
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Ought Implies Can
¬  (↵ ^ ¬↵)
This property could also be represented as ¬ ? as the conjunction of con-
flicting tasks, ↵ ^ ¬↵, will be a logical contradiction and can therefore be
represented by ?. The property states that if there is an obligation then
it should be possible to fulfil it. So it should not be obligatory to do con-
tradictory tasks such as ↵ and ¬↵. Now this brings the dilemma of how to
detect violations, as these will be situations where contradictions involving
obligations occur. If we cannot allow such a conflict, then there is a need to
find a method for violation detection [21, 23].
Distribution
If |= ↵ !  , then KB |⇡  ↵ !   
Let’s say we know that ↵ !   is a tautology and then find out that ↵ being
true is obligatory. It is then intuitive to require that   is also obligatory. If
we have that “students write exams” and have that “you have to be a student”
then we should be able to derive that “you have to write exams”.
Deontic Explosion Principle
Finally, we present a principle which we desire of a deontic system and that
principle is the underivability of deontic explosion. Let’s say we have a knowl-
edge base with  ↵ and  ¬↵ as well as the properties of Weakening and
Conjunction. The following is a possible derivation of deontic explosion.
KB |⇡  ↵,KB |⇡  ¬↵
KB |⇡  (↵ _  ),KB |⇡  ¬↵
KB |⇡    ^ ¬↵
KB |⇡   
Deontic explosion is where any obligation can be derived once an inconsis-
tency occurs such as when there is both  ↵ and  ¬↵ [8, 21]. This occurs
from the combination of Conjunction and Weakening [21]. This an undesir-
able occurrence since a conflict between two obligations in the actual world
does not allow for any other act to be obligatory. This is an issue that will
not affect an ideal system.
27 Chapter 4
Enriching deontic logic with typicality
4.4 Paradoxes
A deontic paradox is a set of deontic conditionals that give a counter-intuitive
result even though the conditionals themselves are consistent and intuitive.
We chose these paradoxes as they occur frequently in the deontic logic lit-
erature [8, 21, 23, 27]. One of the reasons that the paradoxes are primarily
used to analyse the logic systems is that the paradoxes are of similar struc-
ture to many other deontic examples [27]. They also provide difficulty to the
logics that the straightforward examples would not, as they posed a chal-
lenge for deontic logic researchers for many years [20, 21, 27]. The paradoxes
will be presented and the derivations of their issues detailed. Some of them
have multiple issues presented in order to show there being multiple paths to
problems within the paradoxes. For obligations  ( 1 | ↵1) and  ( 2 | ↵2),
we say that the second obligation is a contrary-to-duty obligation of the
first if its antecedent ↵2 is contradictory to the consequent of the first,  1
[8, 21, 23, 27]. Intuitively, this means an obligation that informs us what
must be the case when something forbidden has been done [26]. We can also
say that the second obligation is an according-to-duty obligation of the first
if its antecedent ↵2 logically implies the consequent of the first  1. This tells
us what to do when an obligation has been fulfilled [21, 23, 27].
The following figures show derivations of obligations by using an arrow with
a subscript containing the abbreviation of the property which was used for
the derivation.  (  | ↵) !W  (  | ↵) means that Weakening was used
to go from  (  | ↵) to  (  | ↵). Weakening would be an applicable
property in this example if we knew   !   to always be true. The deriva-
tions that involve more than one obligation as the premise have the obliga-
tions displayed between braces and separated by a comma. The derivation
{ (  | ↵), (  | ↵)} !Conj  (  ^   | ↵) means that the Conjunction
property was used on the obligations  (  | ↵) and  (  | ↵) to derive
 (  ^   | ↵).
4.4.1 Forrester’s paradox
This paradox comprises three statements: two obligations and a fact. “You
must not kill anybody”, “If you kill someone then you must kill them gently”
and “You killed someone ”. With these we also have the background knowl-
edge that “Killing gently implies killing”. The paradox’s statements can be
represented by the following set of deontic statements.
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{ ¬k, (g | k), k}
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1.  ¬k !W  ¬g
2.  ¬g !RSA  (¬g | k)
3. { (¬g | k), (g | k)} !Conj  (¬g ^ g | k)
We represent the background knowledge with the propositional formula g !
k and we assumed it to hold throughout. When we apply Weakening we
can derive the obligation “You must not kill gently” from the first obligation,
“You must not kill anybody”. This is sensible since killing gently is still an
act of killing which we want to be forbidden. We proceed to use Restricted
Strengthening of the Antecedent and the fact “You killed someone” to move
from the non-conditional obligation “You must not kill gently” to the condi-
tional obligation “If you kill then you must not kill gently”. This derivation is
an issue with the paradox as it is counter-intuitive for an obligation to be the
premise from which its own contrary-to-duty obligation is derived [21, 23].
Finally, using Conjunction we can derive a contradiction from the obligations
“If you kill then you must not kill gently” and “If you kill then you must kill
gently”.
Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (g | k), k} !FD  g
2. { ¬k,  g} !Conj  (¬k ^ g)
The rule of Factual Detachment gives us the non-conditional obligation “You
must kill gently” from the fact “You killed someone” and the conditional
obligation “If you kill then you must kill gently”. Applying the property
Conjunction to the conditional obligation “You must kill gently” and the non-
conditional obligation “You must not kill anybody” produces the following:
“You must not kill and you must kill gently”. This is a contradiction thus the
derivation of this conjunction is undesirable [21, 23].
4.4.2 Chisholm’s paradox
This paradox comprises four statements: three obligations and a fact. “Jones
must go assist his neighbour”, “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour then he
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must tell them that he is coming”, “If Jones does not go to assist his neighbour
then he must not tell them that he is coming” and “Jones does not go to assist
his neighbour”. The paradox’s statements can be represented by the following
set of deontic statements.
{ a, (t | a), (¬t | ¬a),¬a}
Deontic Detachment, Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (t | a),  a} !DD  t
2. { (¬t | ¬a), ¬a} !FD  ¬t
3. { t, ¬t} !Conj  t ^ ¬t
The non-conditional obligation “Jones must go assist his neighbour”, in com-
bination with the conditional obligation “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour
then he must tell them he is coming” gives us, via Deontic Detachment, the
obligation that “Jones must tell his neighbour he is coming”. Factual De-
tachment also gives the non-conditional obligation “Jones must not tell his
neighbour he is coming” since we have the conditional obligation “If Jones
does not go to assist his neighbour then he must not tell them he is coming”
and the fact that John does not go help his neighbour. There is then a con-
flict as we can use Conjunction to generate “Jones must tell his neighbour he
is coming and Jones must not tell his neighbour he is coming”. It does not
seem reasonable to reject Conjunction in this case so the problem seems to
be between the use Factual Detachment and Deontic Detachment.
In the literature, there seems to have been a divide between supporters of
Factual Detachment and those of Deontic Detachment. Those in support of
Factual Detachment often reject Deontic Detachment on the basis that obli-
gations such as the second in Chisholm’s paradox, “If Jones goes to assist
his neighbour then he must tell them he is coming”, only tell us what to do
in ideal situations and do not give us actual obligations to act upon once
a primary obligation has been violated [11]. On the other hand, Hilpinen
et al. [11] detail an obligation that those in favour of Deontic Detachment
often point to. This obligation is “If Jones will kill his rich aunt now (for the
inheritance), then he ought to shoot her to death” and let’s say we also know
for a fact that he will indeed kill her although he does not have to. Since
it is a fact that he will kill her then he is obligated to shoot her. This then
turns the obligation not to kill her into only an ideal obligation which does
not seem reasonable. This seems to say that Factual Detachment allows for
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a person to act immorally in order to generate an actual obligation that they
can fulfil, which is less immoral. We say this seems unreasonable because
in the end, their obligation would still be to act immorally [11]. Another
example Deontic Detachment supporters might cite is the pragmatic oddity
of Prakken and Sergot [11, 27], which is analogous to the aforementioned
Forrester’s paradox. Ideally, we wish to sacrifice neither property when we
conduct the deontic analysis in later chapters.
Transitivity and Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
1. { (t | a),  a} !Trans  t
2.  t !RSA  (t | ¬a)
3. { (t | ¬a), (¬t | ¬a)} !Conj  (t ^ ¬t | ¬a)
Similarly to the derivations from Deontic Detachment, the application of the
Transitivity property can take us from the obligations “Jones must go assist
his neighbour” and “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour then he must tell
them that he is coming” to the non-conditional obligation “Jones must tell his
neighbour he is coming”. Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent applied
to that obligation then gives us the counter-intuitive “If Jones does not go
assist his neighbour then he must tell them he is coming”. Since we also have
the conditional obligation “If Jones does not go to assist his neighbour then
he must not tell them that he is coming”, this gives us a contradiction.
4.4.3 Fence paradox
This paradox comprises four statements: three obligations and a fact. “There
must not be a fence”, “If there is a fence then it must be a white fence”, “If
there is a dog then there must be a white fence” and “There is a fence”.
The paradox’s statements can be represented by the following set of deontic
statements.
{ ¬f, (f ^ w | f), (f ^ w | d), f}
The main point of interest regarding this paradox is concerned with the
distinguishing between a violation and exception whenever there is a fence. If
there is a fence and a dog is present then this represents an exception and the
first obligation intuitively is not violated but is rather overridden. Whereas
the presence of a fence without a dog should be considered a violation. So
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 (¬f | f) should be derivable but not  (¬f | f ^ d) which is a problem if
there is a form of the property Strengthening the Antecedent. This property
allows for that derivation of  (¬f | f ^d) when a dog is present [21, 23, 27].
4.4.4 Trump/Kim paradox
This paradox is an alphabetic variant of the Reykjavik scenario [27]. This
version comprises four obligations. “Trump must not be told the secret”, “Kim
must not be told the secret”, “If you tell Trump then you must tell Kim” and “If
you tell Kim then you must tell Trump”. The obligations can be represented
by the following set of deontic statements.
{ ¬t, ¬k, (k | t), (t | k)}
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1. { ¬t, ¬k} !Conj  (¬t ^ ¬k)
2.  (¬t ^ ¬k) !W  ¬(t ^ k)
3.  ¬(t ^ k) !RSA  (¬(t ^ k) | t)
4. { (¬(t ^ k) | t), (t ^ k | t} !Conj  (¬(t ^ k) ^ t ^ k | t)
This paradox is another example where the combination of Weakening and
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent causes problems. The intuitive
obligation “Do not tell Trump and do not tell Kim” using conjunction can
bring forth the derivation of “Do not tell both Trump and Kim” using Weak-
ening. This seems reasonable as a non-conditional obligation when in com-
bination with the obligations that we should not tell either of them. But
from Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent we are able to derive “If
you tell Trump then do not tell both Trump and Kim” which is a problem
because from the set of premises, we want it to be the case that when we tell
one, we must tell the other. This gives us a conflict. Another issue with this
paradox, besides the one concerning an application of properties, is in how
to interpret the obligations [27]. In much the same fashion as other para-
doxes, one must decide whether the statements { (k | t), (t | k)} should
be treated as exceptions to the first two and therefore when we have t^ k to
be true, there is no violation. Or if we want the derivation of  (¬k | t ^ k)
and  (¬t | t^ k), which explicitly tell us there is a violation. Van der Torre
states that the latter interpretation is the preferred one [27] and later in the
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dissertation, we see that the tools we use for analysing the paradoxes will
guide which interpretation we aim for.
4.4.5 Van Fraassen’s paradox
This paradox comprises two obligations. “You must honour your father or
honour your mother” and “You must not honour your mother”. The obliga-
tions can be represented by the following set of deontic statements.
{ (f _m), ¬m}
Weakening and Conjunction
1. { (f _m),  ¬m} !Conj  (f ^ ¬m)
2.  (f ^ ¬m) !W  f
This paradox illustrates the issue of deontic explosion when we have the
properties of Conjunction and Weakening. This first model shows how the
desired obligation “You must honour your father” can be derived using these
properties. Combining “You must honour your father or honour your mother”
and “You must not honour your mother” tells one to honour their father. This
justifies the desire to have these properties in a deontic system as the result
is intuitive. But the following derivations, shows that once there is a conflict,
the properties allow one to derive any other obligation. If we were to add the
obligation “You must honour your mother” to the above paradox then this
will be analogous to the following example generalised using formulas ↵ and
 . This further demonstrates the issue with deontic explosion.
1.  ↵ !W  (↵ _  )
2. { (↵ _  ),  ¬↵} !Conj  (¬↵ ^  )
3.  (¬↵ ^  ) !W   
There is another similarly structured example presented in by Van der
Torre [27] called the Apples-and-Pears example. This example shows that
there is also a problem with interpretation when Restricted Strengthening of
the Antecedent is used on the example’s set of obligations. The example has
the set of obligations, { (a_p), ¬a} which represent the statements, “You
must buy apples or buy pears” and “You must not buy apples”. One could have
a conditional interpretation where the derivation of  (p | a) is acceptable
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because we have  p informing us that pears must always be bought upon
the condition >. Whereas one can interpret the example contextually, so
once we know that apples have been bought then there is no intuitive reason
why pears must be bought. The obligation  a_ p has already been fulfilled
and the obligation  ¬a has already been violated. Therefore, we should not
derive  (p | a) [27].
1. { a _ p, ¬a} !Conj  ¬a ^ p
2.  ¬a ^ p !W  p
3.  p !RSA  (p | a)
Van Fraassen’s paradox has been chosen to present an example that
specifically deals with deontic explosion, while the Apples-and-Pears exam-
ple presents a more intuitive reading of the obligations for the discussion of




In this chapter, we present Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL), the logic
system with which we explore the notion of typicality. PTL is formed by
enriching classical propositional logic with an explicit operator to represent
typicality [1].
5.1 Language
Definition 5.1. Given a set of propositional letters  , the language of PTL,
denoted by L•, is formed with the bullet operator, •, added to the propositional
logic language [1]. This operator can be attached in front of any propositional
formula. For example, for a propositional letter p, we could have •p in L•
with its intuition being that it represents the most typical situations where p
holds.
We can use this operator similarly to the negation operator and placed in
front of any propositional formula, and we can apply in a nested fashion such
as in the following example PTL formula ••p. Note that this means that PTL
is more expressive than KLM-style defeasible reasoning [1] and deontic logic
as the bullet operator can be applied to both the antecedent and consequent
side of a conditional. The following PTL statements illustrate the type of
statements that can be represented with the PTL language. •p ! q reads
as “the most typical situations where p holds, imply the situations where q
holds”, •p ! •¬q reads as “the most typical situations where p holds, imply
the most typical situations where q does not hold” and (•p _ •q) ! •r reads
as “the most typical situations where p holds or the most typical situations
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where q holds, imply the most typical situations where r holds”. We now
present the semantics for PTL, which utilises the familiar concept of ranked
interpretations.
5.2 Semantics
Definition 5.2. Let’s say we have W being the set of possible valuations,
ranked interpretations are pairs < V,>, where V ✓ W and  is a total
preorder over V . Intuitively, the valuations pushed lower down the rankings
are more typical than those that are higher up [1]. Note that J↵KR represents
the set of valuations that satisfy a formula ↵ for a given ranked interpretation
R [1]. Satisfaction of a formula, let’s says ↵, is done in the classical way of
propositional logic with the addition of the following [1]:
• v |= •↵ iff v |= ↵ and there is not a v0  v such that v0 |= ↵. So the
valuations that satisfy •↵ will be the minimal valuations that satisfy a.
So J•↵KR := min(J↵KR) for a ranked interpretation R.
Note that the typicality •-operator can be used to express any KLM-style
conditional. That is, for every ranked interpretation R and every ↵,   2 L,
R |= ↵ |⇠   if and only if R |= •↵ !  . There are L•-sentences that cannot
be expressed using KLM-style |⇠-statements on L, so the converse does not
hold [1]. Now we outline the first method of entailment we will use, which
Booth et al. [1] proposed.
5.3 LM-entailment
The first form of entailment to be looked at is one that produces a sin-
gle ranked model that is constructed to be the LM-minimum model for the
knowledge base where LM refers to Lehmann and Magidor [1]. A sequence of
ranked interpretations (R0,R1,R2,...), which is created during the algorithm,
will be used to construct R⇤KB, which will be the model used for entailment.
The algorithm will make use of ranks to construct R⇤KB. The ranks represent
a level in the ranked interpretation, where the rank of a valuation u is less
than the rank of v if and only if u < v, as defined in definition 5.2 [1]. The
following brief explains some notation used during the LM-entailment algo-
rithm. In this algorithm, we say R1S is the ranked interpretation obtained
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when any valuation not in S, where S ✓ V R , has its rank increased by 1.
Similarly, R1S is the ranked interpretation obtained from R by setting the
rank of all valuations not in S to 1 [1]. These would be those at the highest
level of R⇤KB and deemed to be atypical. Now to present the algorithm steps
[1].
Step 1 Set the ranks of all valuations in the knowledge base to 0, define
S0 which is initially empty and have variable i equal to 1.
Step 2 Find the valuations which satisfy the knowledge base with respect
to the current ranked interpretation R0 and put them into the set S1.
Step 3 If Si is equal to Si 1 then there has not been a change so set the rank
of all the valuations that do not satisfy the knowledge base, with respect to
Ri, to 1 and return the interpretation that remains.
Step 4 Otherwise create a new ranked interpretation Ri, by increasing the
rank of every valuation not in Si by 1.
Step 5 Find the valuations which satisfy the knowledge base with respect
to the current ranked interpretation Ri and put them in the set Si+1 and
finally, increment i.
Step 6 Go to Step 3.
Now to walk through an example to illustrate the algorithm’s steps. Let’s
take the knowledge base, {•p ! ¬f, •b ! f, p ! b}. We can read the state-
ments as “typical penguins do not fly”, “typical birds do fly” and “penguins are
birds”. Considering the statements we have, the situations we would desire
the most are situations where there are no penguins while the most typical
birds do fly as these would satisfy all the statements. It seems reasonable that
the next best situation is when the most typical penguins do not fly while
we can have that atypical birds also do not fly. Next, we have situations
where atypical penguins do fly. The least desirable situations are when we
have penguins that are not birds at all as this violates a classical conditional.
Now we check if the model’s reasoning matches our intuition. First, we note
that because of the last statement we can immediately discount the valu-
ations {p,¬b, f} and {p,¬b,¬f} as having infinite rank as they will never
satisfy the set of statements. We have the following valuations to exam-
ine: {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}, {¬p,¬b,¬f}, {p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}, {p, b, f}. So
we begin by setting the rank of all the valuations to 0. The valuations
that satisfy all the statements are {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f} and {¬p,¬b,¬f}.
Therefore, they become the first level of our model, S1, and this decreases
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the remaining valuations to check. S1 := JKBKR0 = {{¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f},
{¬p,¬b,¬f}}. All the valuations not in S1 obtain a rank of 1. The valuations
that satisfy all the statements w.r.t. R1 are S2 := JKBKR1 = {{p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}}.
S3 will be the valuation {p, b, f}. As previously mentioned, the valuations
in S4, which are {p,¬b, f} and {p,¬b,¬f}, will not satisfy the statements
so S4 will remain the same as S5 and so on. The algorithm terminates at
this stage. The algorithm’s steps are both concisely and formally presented
in Algorithm 4
R0
0. {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}, {¬p,¬b,¬f}, {p, b,¬f}
{¬p, b,¬f}, {p, b, f}, {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
R1
1. {p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}, {p, b, f}, {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
0. {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}{¬p,¬b,¬f}
R2
2. {p, b, f}, {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
1. {p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}, {p, b, f}, {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
0. {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}{¬p,¬b,¬f}
R3
3. {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
2. {p, b, f}
1. {p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}
0. {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}{¬p,¬b,¬f}
R⇤KB
1 {p,¬b, f}, {p,¬b,¬f}
2. {p, b, f}
1. {p, b,¬f}, {¬p, b,¬f}
0. {¬p, b, f}, {¬p,¬b, f}{¬p,¬b,¬f}
Figure 5.1: The ranked models for the Bird example generated during the
execution of the LM-entailment algorithm. R⇤KB is the final model and gives
us the entailment.
Definition 5.3. (LM-entailment) Let’s say we have KB ✓ L• and a 2 L•,
then KB |⇡LM a, which means KB LM-entails a, if R⇤KB   a. R   a
denotes that R is a ranked model of a and is true if JaKR = WR, which tells
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1  KB := {p | p is a propositional letter in KB};
2 W is the non-empty set of possible valuation for  KB;
3 R0(v) := 0 for every v 2 W ;
4 S0 := ;;
5 S1 := JKBKR0 ;
6 i := 1;
7 while Si 6= Si 1<0 do
8 Ri := (Ri 1)1Si ;
9 SI+1 := JKBKRi ;
10 i := i+ 1;






This section details the second entailment method for PTL, PT-entailment,
which is the shortened term for Presumption of Typicality-entailment [1],
referring to the property previously detailed in section 3.6. The intuition
behind this entailment corresponds with that of the Presumption of Typicality
property. For this entailment, we consider the models in which each valuation
is taken to be as low or as typical as possible with respect to the satisfaction
of the knowledge base. These will be the models in minEPTMod(KB) where
Mod(KB) := {R | R   VKB}. The relation EPT is defined as follows.
Definition 5.4. For two ranked interpretations R1 and R2, R1 EPT R2 if
and only if for every v 2 W , R1(v)  R2(v), where R1(v) represents the
rank of the valuation v in R1. We also have that R1 /PT R2 if and only if
R1 EPT R2 and not R2 EPT R1. Note that the relation EPT is a preorder
over the ranked interpretations.
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This entailment can produce several minimal models as opposed to the
single model of LM-entailment and a formula is entailed by KB if and only
if it is true in all the minimal models of KB. Note that the single model
produced by LM-entailment will always be among these minimal models [1].
This means that PT-entailment infers, at most, what is inferred by the LM-
entailment model since we can base it on multiple models on top of the
LM-entailment model. PT-entailment cannot come up with conclusions that
are not entailed by LM-entailment. The following example is presented by
Booth et al. [1]. The knowledge base is {•> ! (¬p ^ ¬r), •p ! •¬f, •r !
•f, p ! ¬r}. We read the statements as “the most typical things are neither
penguins nor robins”, “typical penguins are typical non-flying birds”, “typical
robins are typical flying birds” and “ penguins are not robins”. The ranked
model, R⇤KB, without the 1-rank valuations is:
0. {¬f,¬p,¬r}, {f,¬p, r} .
The minimality concept of PT-entailment then gives us the following three
models where LM-entailment’s R⇤KB is the ranked interpretation R1 amongst
these models.







1. {f,¬p, r}, {f.¬p,¬r}
0. {¬f,¬p,¬r}
Figure 5.2: The three PT-entailment models for the knowledge base {•> !
(¬p ^ ¬r), •p ! •¬f, •r ! •f, p ! ¬r}
For a statement to be true, it must be satisfied by all three models. For
example, we can derive that the statement •f ! ¬p is entailed as all the
lowest valuations where f is satisfied also satisfy ¬p in all three models.
This derived statement tells us that the most typical flying things are not
penguins, which is a sensible conclusion.
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Definition 5.5. (PT-entailment) Let’s say we have KB ✓ L• and ↵ 2 L•,





This chapter briefly details the process used to check the effectiveness of
the logic systems we are investigating. This efficacy refers to how well the
logic system can be used to represent and reason about the deontic scenarios.
Much of the evaluation of such efficacy will rely on intuition gained through
assessing the literature. There are many discussions and results, which speak
to what is deemed to be acceptable and reasonable, that can be leaned on
as intuitive guidance. The analysis process for each logic system broadly
involves working through the following three stages: Representation, Prop-
erties and Paradoxes. We discuss these stages now in more detail.
Representation
First, we must settle upon a translation of deontic statements into the specific
language of the logic being analysed. We must be able to consistently apply
this representation method and it must provide an intuitive reading. This
reading is guided by the semantics of the respective logics, as statements in
their languages have established interpretations. Once we decide upon this
method of representation, the process would continue to the next stage which
deals with the properties.
Properties
This stage investigates which of the deontic properties are applicable in the
logic that is being analysed. Ideally, the logic in question would generally
satisfy each property. If that is not the case, we check whether the prop-
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erty can be reasonably applied to translated statements in some instances.
This process will comprise assuming the property’s premises and observ-
ing consequences that followed. We have the following to check: Restricted
Strengthening of the Antecedent, Factual Detachment, Deontic Detachment,
Transitivity, Disjunction, Conjunction, Weakening, Ought Implies Can prin-
ciple and Distribution along with the satisfaction of the Deontic Explosion
Principle. Once we check the properties within the logic system, we continue
to the analysis of the paradoxes since we now have a way to represent their
statements and the properties we can use to perform derivations.
Paradoxes
To analyse the paradoxes, we first translate the statements of each para-
dox into the relevant logic’s language and then we take the paradox through
the available reasoning methods. When interpreting the paradoxes and their
results, there are two options in terms of interpretations that can be made
when confronted with conflicting obligations [27].
1. We could accept the derivation of  ? which explicitly tells us that
there is a dilemma with the obligations. The reasoning methods would
need to accommodate this, allowing us to explicitly state that there is
a violation while continuing to produce other sensible derivations.
2. We could accept the “ought implies can” principle which tells us that the
derivation of  ? is undesirable since we do not want to be obligated
to perform two contradictory tasks. In this situation, we would want
to derive the best possible obligations in the less-than-ideal scenario
where we have a conflict.
Much of the literature suggests that the second approach is the most rea-
sonable interpretation and since it is the most sensible to us, it will be the
one we adopt moving forward [21, 23]. We restate the paradoxes that will
be analysed: Forrester’s paradox, Chisholm’s paradox, Fence paradox, the
Trump/Kim paradox and Van Fraassen’s paradox. With PTL-entailment,
where we cannot analyse the paradoxes for reasons that will outlined in
chapter 9, we put forward alternative examples. These alternative examples





This chapter presents the analysis of KLM-style defeasible reasoning and its
effectiveness in handling deontic scenarios. KLM-style defeasible reasoning
was formally presented in chapter 3 and the analysis process was outlined in
the previous chapter. We begin by establishing a defeasible translation for
the deontic statements using the defeasible implication operator |⇠. Then the
properties section shows which of the desired deontic properties are satisfied
by the KLM approach. The motivation to perform the analysis of the para-
doxes using the lexicographic closure algorithm, rather than that of rational
closure, is then briefly presented. Thereafter, we observe how we can use
lexicographic closure to block the undesirable derivations of the paradoxes.
7.1 Representation
In order to select a method with which to represent deontic statements using
the KLM defeasible implications, we take a look at the similar semantics
of DSDL and the KLM approach. Recall that a deontic obligation such as
 (  | ↵) tells us that the ‘best’ ↵-valuations are also  -valuations, and
↵ |⇠   has the same reading. This is to say that given the set of valuations
that satisfy ↵, J↵K = {s 2 V : s |= ↵}, both  (  | ↵) and ↵ |⇠   provide
us with similar interpretations. The former states that 8 s0 2 V , if s0 2 {s 2
J↵K : s  t, 8 t 2 J↵K} where  is a total preorder over W , then s0 |=  .
The latter, on the other hand, states that 8 s0 2 V , if s0 2 {s 2 J↵K : @ t 2
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J↵K, such that t < s}, then s0 |=  , where  is a modular order. We present
a guide to translate the deontic statements into their KLM equivalents. For
the translation of deontic obligations into the language of the KLM approach,
we say that  (  | ↵) is equivalent to ↵ |⇠  . Non-conditional obligations
such as  ↵ will be represented as > |⇠ ↵. Facts are given in the usual way,
such as ↵. This gives an appropriate method to handle the translation of
deontic statements and allows for the analysis to continue.
7.2 Properties
In the following section, we look at which of the deontic properties that
we deemed desirable are satisfied by the KLM-style defeasible reasoning ap-
proach. This begins with an analysis of the “ought implies can” principle’s
satisfaction and its subsequent impact on how we reason within the KLM
logic system.
7.2.1 Ought Implies Can Principle and Violations
When working with obligations, we ideally want to be able to explicitly state
whether a certain fact brings up a violation with respect to our set of obliga-
tions. This will require the logic system we use to cater for the occurrence of
conflicts. But when dealing with these KLM defeasible implications we will
see that neither of our chosen KLM reasoning algorithms, rational closure
nor lexicographic closure, can perform their reasoning with the presence of
conflicts and thus satisfy the “ought implies can” principle. If one is obli-
gated to perform a task then they should be able to do so, therefore the
task should not be simultaneously obligatory and prohibited. This principle
can be represented by the derivation of ¬   (↵ ^ ¬↵) which tells us that
there is no obligation to perform contradictory tasks. With conflicts being
an explicit indication that a violation has occurred, the “ought implies can”
principle means we must find a way to detect violations.
Recall that in many of the paradoxes, there are facts which represent the oc-
currence of a violation of some obligation. For example, amongst Forrester’s
paradox’s statements, we had the non-conditional obligation  ¬k and the
fact k. The latter representing a violation of the former. As a result of the
“ought implies can” principle, when we analyse contrary-to-duty obligations
we cannot have the contradictory facts in the defeasible knowledge base as
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this will cause conflicts. This is due to the need for the defeasible knowl-
edge base to be consistent when using the reasoning algorithms. Instead, we
will initially remove the facts from the knowledge base and determine which
general obligations arise from the set of obligations we have along with the
background knowledge. We then use the facts as a premise when examining
the derivations of actual obligations. These actual obligations refer to the
obligations which a hypothetical agent must act upon when we take certain
facts into consideration. For example, let’s say we have the following set
of statements {p, ¬p, q, (r | p)} which are in deontic form. We will
remove the fact p from the knowledge base and observe that we initially have
the obligations  ¬p,  q and  (r | p). Once we reintroduce p, we see that
we no longer have the obligation  ¬p but now derive the non-conditional
obligation  r, derived using the Deontic Detachment property, amongst the
other remaining obligations.
This approach to dealing with these contradictory instances allows us to gen-
erate conclusions from the facts and knowledge base. The intuition of this
approach is that when we do not have the fact as part of the knowledge base,
derivations can be thought of as occurring in a world where this fact has not
transpired. We consider these to be general or primary obligations. Once
we introduce a fact, derivations will be interpreted as if the fact holds and
thus obligations that were formally in force may no longer be, given this fact.
And since we cannot have conflicts this immediately blocks deontic explosion
which is the desired consequence.
A consequence of avoiding conflicts in order to do reasoning is that we cannot
explicitly detect specific violations during the use of the reasoning algorithms.
The reasoning methods we use can give us the best-case scenario in an un-
desirable situation that a violation has occurred but there is no way to state
whether an obligation was violated during reasoning. To circumvent this, we
temporarily keep a fact in the knowledge base before the application of the
reasoning algorithm and check if the knowledge base is inconsistent. If so,
then we must determine which obligations have been violated. To do this,
we test for every obligation in the knowledge base, whether this obligation
is in conflict with the fact in question. All those obligations which form an
inconsistent pair with the fact will be those which have been violated.
We note another drawback to this approach on facts. This being the inabil-
ity to represent statements that specifically tell us whether an obligation has
been fulfilled or an obligation has been violated. An example of this being
( p) ^ p to explicitly state that the obligation to do p has been fulfilled or
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the violation-equivalent ( p) ^ ¬p [20].
7.2.2 Remaining properties
In chapter 3 we have that the following desired deontic properties are sat-
isfied by the defeasible entailment relation of both rational closure and lex-
icographic closure, |⇡: Weakening, Conjunction, Disjunction and a version
of Transitivity called Cumulative Transitivity. We restate these properties
below and show that the following properties are also satisfied: Distribution,














The property of Distribution was presented in section 4.3 as follows.
If |= ↵ !  , then KB |⇡  ↵ !   
Recall that this tells us that if we assume that ↵ implies  , then if we have
that one is obligated to do ↵ then one is obligated to do  . We represent it
using the following KLM derivation.
|= ↵ !  ,KB |⇡ > |⇠ ↵
KB |⇡ > |⇠  
This property is satisfied, and we can see this if we apply the Weakening
property. Assume we have ↵ !   as a tautology and the statement > |⇠ ↵
which represents  ↵. The application of the Weakening property then en-
ables the derivation of > |⇠  , which represents   .
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Factual Detachment
The following is the property of Factual Detachment in deontic form and
we want to show that it holds for the KLM approach.
KB |⇡  (  | ↵), |= ↵
KB |⇡   
The following is the property translated into the language of the KLM ap-
proach.
KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠  , |= ↵
KB |⇡ > |⇠  
If we have that ↵ is a tautology then we can state ↵ |⇠   as > |⇠   so we
have that the property holds.
Deontic Detachment
The following is the property of Deontic Detachment in deontic form and
we want to show that it holds for the KLM approach.
KB |⇡  (  | ↵),KB |⇡  ↵
KB |⇡   
The following is the property translated into the language of the KLM ap-
proach.
KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠  ,KB |⇡ > |⇠ ↵
KB |⇡ > |⇠  
Let’s say we have {↵ |⇠  ,> |⇠ ↵} and we want to derive > |⇠  . It holds
that ↵ ⌘ > ^ ↵, so by Left Logical Equivalence we obtain > ^ ↵ |⇠  . If
we take that derived defeasible implication, >^ ↵ |⇠  , and combine it with
> |⇠ ↵ then we can use the Cumulative Transitivity property to get > |⇠  .
7.2.3 Strengthening of the Antecedent
Recall the Strengthening of the Antecedent property from deontic logic pre-
sented in chapter 4, which is given in deontic form below.
KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵ ^  )
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Since the reasoning we will use is non-monotonic, we will not have the above
property of Strengthening of the Antecedent/Monotonicity [13]. We instead
have the property of Rational Monotonicity with KLM-style defeasible rea-
soning.
KB |⇡ ↵ |⇠  ,KB |⇡ ↵ 6|⇠ ¬ 
KB |⇡ ↵ ^   |⇠  
We now attempt to convert this property into deontic form in order to de-
termine whether it reads suitably and can, therefore, be adopted as an al-
ternative to Strengthening of the Antecedent for the KLM approach. The
KLM statement ↵ |⇠   can be translated to  (  | ↵) and the derived KLM
statement ↵^  |⇠   can be translated to  (  | ↵^ ). Now to translate the
KLM statement ↵ 6|⇠ ¬ . This statement tells us that it is not the case that
every minimal valuation that satisfies ↵ also satisfies ¬ . In other words,
there exists at least one minimal ↵-valuation that satisfies  . To translate it,
we would need a deontic statement that states that there exists a minimal
valuation that satisfies ↵ that does not satisfy ¬ . This can be written in
deontic form as KB |⇡ ¬  (¬  | ↵). Thus the deontic version of the entire
translated property appears as follows.
KB |⇡  (  | ↵),KB |⇡ ¬  (¬  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵ ^  )
Although not having the Strengthening of the Antecedent property blocks
us from intuitive derivations, its omission also results in many issues within
the paradoxes no longer arising, which we will detail in section 7.4. As seen
in section 4.4, where the paradoxes were first presented, some of the issues
within the paradoxes are a result of derivations made using a version of this
Strengthening of the Antecedent property. Once we remove the property,
those derivations are no longer possible.
7.3 Why use lexicographic closure?
In terms of the reasoning methods, we select from the two options previously
presented in chapter 3. These two options are rational closure and lexico-
graphic closure. The following is an example meant to justify the selection
of lexicographic closure as the method of use from now on. The statements
for our example are “Students usually do not pay taxes”, “Students who work
usually have to pay taxes”, and “Student usually have to be registered”. We
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also have the statement “Students who work are students”, which acts as a
fact so is therefore omitted from the following set.
{s |⇠ ¬t, s ^ w |⇠ t, s |⇠ r}
This is similar to the Bird example from chapter 3. This example’s fact,
“Students who work are students”, is analogous to the Bird example’s p ! b
which is “Penguins are birds”, would be represented as s^w. The statement
b |⇠ f is analogous to s |⇠ ¬t while p |⇠ ¬f is analogous to s^w |⇠ t and b |⇠
w is analogous to s |⇠ r. It seems reasonable to infer that students who work
must be registered, s ^ w |⇠ r, but this is not possible with rational closure.
Whereas with lexicographic closure it is possible to make that derivation,
even though students who work are not considered typical students. This is
similar to how we can derive that penguins have wings in the Bird example
using lexicographic closure, whereas rational closure fails to do so. The desire
is for obligations which are usually in force for students to be applicable to
atypical students unless we are given evidence to the contrary. These are the
sort of derivations which justify the use of the less conservative, presumptive
reading of lexicographic closure when doing normative reasoning. Our claim
is not that the presumptive reading will always be more suitable than the
prototypical reading, but it is the preferred choice moving forward with our
deontic analysis.
7.4 Paradoxes
We proceed to apply the lexicographic closure algorithm to the paradoxes
which will be translated using our chosen KLM representation.
7.4.1 Forrester’s paradox
This paradox comprises three statements. The obligations “You must not
kill anybody” and “If you kill someone then you must kill them gently” as
well as the fact “You killed someone”. Along with these we also have the
background knowledge, “Killing gently implies killing”. The KLM equivalent
of these obligations is given in the following set of KLM statements and this
comes with the translated background knowledge, g ! k and the fact k.
{> |⇠ ¬k, k |⇠ g}
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The fact k causes the knowledge base to become inconsistent if we include
it during reasoning. This means we have a violation. If we check the fact
against every obligation in the materialisation set
 !KB = {> ! ¬k, k ! g},
it is clear that > |⇠ ¬k is the obligation that is violated. We proceed to
determine the ranks of the statements. We now have a consistent
 !KB to
construct the ranking of the statements. We have B̃ = {> |⇠ ¬k, k |⇠ g}
with r(> |⇠ ¬k) = 0 and r(k |⇠ g) = 1 so the ranking would be the following:
1 k |⇠ g
0 > |⇠ ¬k
Now we examine what we can gather given the above ranking and compare
this with the derivations shown in chapter 4. In that chapter, we observed the
problematic conclusions that we could derived with the paradox’s obligations
and certain deontic properties.
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1.  ¬k !W  ¬g
2.  ¬g !RSA  (¬g | k)
3. { (¬g | k), (g | k)} !Conj  (¬g ^ g | k)
We first want to check if we can derive  ¬g as a general obligation, via
the Weakening property, before we apply the fact. As a non-conditional
obligation, we assume the tautology, > as the premise and observe if we can
derive ¬g. Recall that in chapter 3, the structure of the lexicographic closure
derivation for a formula, let’s say w, are p[A[D |= w for every D 2 T where
p is the premise. As stated above, we have > as the premise. We then have
D = {> ! ¬k, k ! g} and we include the background knowledge g ! k
in the set of statements which have infinite rank, A, where it is the only
statement. We have A = {g ! k} and note that the statement, g ! k, is
equivalent to ¬k ! ¬g from contraposition. We have the following derivation
which shows that ¬g follows from our knowledge base using lexicographic
closure.
{>} [ {g ! k} [ {> ! ¬k, k ! g} |= ¬g
We move on to check whether we can derive the undesirable conditional obli-
gation  (¬g | k). We derived this using Restricted Strengthening of the An-
tecedent in the above derivations table, but we do not have this property. It
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is thus interesting to observe whether the alternative, Rational Monotonicity,
‘blocks’ this undesirable obligation from being derived. We would consider
to be an actual obligation which occurs when we take the fact that killing
has occurred. For this situation, we have k as the premise and D = {k ! g}.
This results in the following derivation which tells us we cannot derive ¬g
from the knowledge base given the fact k.
{k} [ {g ! k} [ {k ! g} 6|= ¬g
Intuitively, this tells us that although we can originally derive  ¬g which
tells us “do not kill gently” in general, once one kills then we retract that
obligation. The individual will now be obligated to kill gently once they
have killed and this does which seems reasonable initially. But violated
obligations no longer being derivable, referred to as the drowning problem,
is considered an undesirable result in the literature [23]. It is important to
note this drawback.
Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (g | k), k} !FD  g
2. { ¬k,  g} !Conj  (¬k ^ g)
For the first derivation, we examine whether we can derive  g given the fact
k. With this being a non-conditional obligation, we would have normally
have the tautology as the premise but taking the fact k into account means
we use k as a premise. We also have that D = {k ! g} and A = {g ! k}.
The following derivation tells us we can derive  g.
{k} [ {g ! k} [ {k ! g} |= g
We also see lexicographic closure blocks the issue that arises between Factual
Detachment and Conjunction where  (¬k^ g) can be derived. We continue
to take k as the premise since it has already been taken it into account.
We still have D = {k ! g} and A = {g ! k}. Although g follows from
this lexicographic closure configuration, we cannot derive ¬k and therefore
cannot derive the undesirable  (¬k ^ g) using lexicographic closure.
{k} [ {g ! k} [ {k ! g} 6|= ¬k ^ g
This tells us that although we originally had the non-conditional obligation
to not kill, if one kills then we can retract that non-conditional obligation,
avoiding a violation. Then we can aim for the next best scenario, which
would be for one to kill gently.
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7.4.2 Chisholm’s paradox
This paradox comprises four statements. The obligations “Jones must go
assist his neighbour”, “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour then he must tell
them that he is coming” and “If Jones does not go to assist his neighbour then
he must not tell them that he is coming” as well as the fact “Jones does not
go to assist his neighbour”. The following is the KLM-style representation of
the paradox’s statements. We have the following knowledge base along with
the fact ¬a.
{> |⇠ a, a |⇠ t,¬a |⇠ ¬t}
Introducing the fact into the knowledge base would lead to a conflict while
using lexicographic closure and this is because of the obligation, > |⇠ a. This
tells us that the obligation, “Jones must go assist his neighbour”, was violated
by the fact of Jones not going to assist his neighbour. We construct the
rankings with the knowledge base without the fact, ¬a. The set of defeasible
implications with a rank less then infinity is B̃ = {> |⇠ a, a |⇠ t,¬a |⇠ ¬t}
and the ranking is given below. We have r(a |⇠ t) = 0, r(> |⇠ a) = 0 and
r(¬a |⇠ ¬t) = 1.
1 ¬a |⇠ ¬t
0 > |⇠ a, a |⇠ t
Now we examine what can be gathered given the above ranking and compare
this with the derivations shown in chapter 4.
Transitivity and Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
1. { (t | a),  a} !Trans  t
2.  t !RSA  (t | ¬a)
3. { (t | ¬a), (¬t | ¬a)} !Conj  (t ^ ¬t | ¬a)
The general obligation  t, via Transitivity in the above table and can also
be done via the Deontic Detachment property, is now shown to be derivable
using lexicographic closure. Since we have not taken the fact into account,
we use > as the premise, we have the following derivation of t with D =
{> ! a, a ! t,¬a ! ¬t}.
{>} [ {> ! a, a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} |= t
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With  t being determined as a derivable general obligation, we then observe
whether we can derive the conditional obligation  (t | ¬a). This was derived
via the use of the Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedant property in the
above table. We take the fact ¬a to be true and then have that there is a
single most serious subset which satisfies the premise, D = {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t}.
But if we take ¬a to be the premise, we then have the following lexicographic
closure derivation.
{¬a} [ {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} 6|= t
This tells us that the derivation of  (t | ¬a) is blocked. We derived this
from  t and the fact ¬a using Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent.
With lexicographic closure not having the Restricted Strengthening of the
Antecedent property, it seems sensible that the undesirable derivations from
this property are then blocked.
Deontic Detachment, Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (t | a),  a} !DD  t
2. { (¬t | ¬a), ¬a} !FD  ¬t
3. { t, ¬t} !Conj  t ^ ¬t
We now see that the issue that arises with the Factual Detachment and
Deontic Detachment properties being used together, is no longer present.
The first derivation, of  t using Deontic Detachment, is satisfied and is
identical to the derivation via Transitivity seen in section 7.4.1.  t is an
obligation that we consider before taking the fact ¬a into account, so we use
> as the premise. We have D = {> ! a, a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} and this gives the
following lexicographic closure derivation.
{>} [ {> ! a, a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} |= t
This result shows us that  t can be derived in general. We now examine
whether  ¬t follows when we take the fact ¬a as having occurred. And with
¬a ! ¬t being in the single most serious subset, D = {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t},
this allows the derivation of ¬t.
{¬a} [ {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} |= ¬t
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We now check whether we can derive t if we continue to use ¬a as a premise.
It remains that D = {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} and t does not follow as seen in the
below derivation. This prevents t^¬t from being derived when we have the
fact ¬a.
{¬a} [ {a ! t,¬a ! ¬t} 6|= t ^ ¬t
The intuition we now have is that the non-conditional obligation  t, which
read as “Jones should tell his neighbour that he is coming”, is no longer in
force when the fact ¬a has happened.
7.4.3 Fence paradox and exceptions
This paradox comprises four statements. The obligations “There must not be
a fence”, “If there is a fence then it must be a white fence” and “If there is a dog
then there must be a white fence” as well as the fact “There is a fence”. This
paradox illustrates the need to distinguish between exceptions and violations
in contrary-to-duty scenarios. We have the following knowledge base with
the fact f .
{> |⇠ ¬f, f |⇠ (f ^ w), d |⇠ (f ^ w)}
The general obligation > |⇠ ¬f , “There must not be a fence”, is violated
when we assume the fact f . We want it to be the case that when a white
fence is present, meaning that f ^ w holds, that we get that there should
be a dog, d should hold. But we cannot get this derivation with the current
KLM representation of the deontic statements as we can see below. We have
the set B̃ = {> |⇠ ¬f, f |⇠ (f ^w), d |⇠ (f ^w)} and we give the ranking of
these statements.
1 f |⇠ (f ^ w), d |⇠ (f ^ w)
0 > |⇠ ¬f
If we take f^w to be the premise, the single most serious subset that satisfies
f ^w is {f ! (f ^w), d ! (f ^w)} which shows that the derivation of d is
not possible using lexicographic closure.
{f ^ w} [ {f ! (f ^ w), d ! (f ^ w)} 6|= d
A representation of exceptions is not immediately obvious using KLM-style
defeasible reasoning and must still be explored.
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7.4.4 Trump/Kim paradox
This paradox comprises four obligations. “Trump must not be told the secret”,
“Kim must not be told the secret”, “If you tell Trump then you must tell Kim”
and “If you tell Kim then you must tell Trump”. The KLM version of the set
of obligations is now given.
{> |⇠ ¬t,> |⇠ ¬k, t |⇠ k, k |⇠ t}
The entire knowledge base makes up the set of non-infinitely ranked obliga-
tions, B̃, and we have the following ranking.
1 t |⇠ k, k |⇠ t
0 > |⇠ ¬t,> |⇠ ¬k
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1. { ¬t, ¬k} !Conj  (¬t ^ ¬k)
2.  (¬t ^ ¬k) !W  ¬(t ^ k)
3.  ¬(t ^ k) !RSA  (¬(t ^ k) | t)
4. { (¬(t ^ k) | t), (t ^ k | t} !Conj  (¬(t ^ k) ^ t ^ k | t)
We have the following two derivations which represent, firstly, Conjunction
used on the two non-conditional obligations and subsequently, Weakening
applied to that resultant conjunction.
{>} [ {> ! ¬t,> ! ¬k, k ! t, t ! k} |= ¬t ^ ¬k
{>} [ {> ! ¬t,> ! ¬k, k ! t, t ! k} |= ¬(t ^ k)
We now examine if we can derive the conditional obligation  (¬(t ^ k) | t).
Once we use the fact t as the premise, the non-conditional obligations > |⇠ ¬t
and > |⇠ ¬k are no longer in the most serious subset. > |⇠ ¬k cannot be
since we have t ! k in the subset and this in combination with t will cause a
conflict. And thus we cannot derive ¬(t^ k) since the conditional obligation
t ! k gives as that k is true along with t. This is shown in the following
derivation.
{t} [ {k ! t, t ! k} 6|= ¬(t ^ k)
This blocks the derivation of the conditional obligation  (¬(t^k)^t^k | t).
Intuitively, this tells us that once we tell one of them the secret, the obligation
to tell neither of them falls away and we must reveal the secret to the other.
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7.4.5 Van Fraassen’s paradox
This paradox comprises two obligations. “You must honour your father or
honour your mother” and “You must not honour your mother”. The obliga-
tions can be represented by the following set of KLM statements.
{> |⇠ f _m,> |⇠ ¬m}
Weakening and Conjunction
1.  ↵ !W  (↵ _  )
2. { (↵ _  ),  ¬↵} !Conj  (¬↵ ^  )
3.  (¬↵ ^  ) !W   
The above undesirable derivation of deontic explosion is blocked because we
have the “ought implies can” principle and thus cannot have both  ↵ and
 ¬↵ in the knowledge base. If we have B̃ = {> |⇠ f _m,> |⇠ ¬m} then
we can see that the two statements will have the same rank.
0 > |⇠ f _m,> |⇠ ¬m
We want to check if we can derive > |⇠ f which would be “You must honor
your father”. This is a non-conditional obligation so the premise will be the
tautology, >. And since both statements satisfy the tautology, we can clearly
see that the intuitive “You must honor your father” can be derived.
{>} [ {> ! f _m,> ! ¬m} |= f
We now look at the alphabetic variant, the Apples-and-Pears example. This
example has the obligations, “You must buy apples or buy pears” and “You
must not buy apples”.
{> |⇠ a _ p,> |⇠ ¬a}
In the Apples-and-Pears example, we could derive  (p | a) from  p through
the use of Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent. This is a derivation
we wish to avoid since this does not fully align with our intuition.
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Weakening, Conjunction and Restricted Strengthening of the An-
tecedent
1. { a _ p, ¬a} !Conj  ¬a ^ p
2.  ¬a ^ p !W  p
3.  p !RSA  (p | a)
Since the Apples-and-Pears example is analogous to Van Fraassen’s paradox,
we know that  p is derivable from our knowledge base in the same way  f
follows in Van Fraassen’s paradox.
{>} [ {> ! p _ a,> ! ¬a} |= p
We now check if we can block the derivation of  (p | a), a |⇠ p in the KLM
representation, from the knowledge base. Take a to be the premise, we can
see that > ! ¬a does not satisfy the premise and thus the most serious
subset contains the lone obligation, > ! p _ a. We then see that p cannot
be derived.
{a} [ {> ! p _ a} 6|= p
This aligns with the contextual interpretation from chapter 4.4.5 which tells
us that once apples have been bought it should be the case that pears ought
to be bought as well.
7.5 Conclusion
We began by determining a method to use the KLM-style defeasible implica-
tions to represent deontic statements. The KLM equivalent of an obligation
such as  (  | ↵) would be ↵ |⇠   while a non-conditional obligation  ↵
would be represented with > |⇠ ↵ and facts would be represented in the
usual way, such as ↵. KLM-style defeasible reasoning satisfies most of the
deontic properties which are seen as suitable for a deontic system to have.
The Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent property was not satisfied
because of the non-monotonicity of KLM, but there is the Rational Mono-
tonicity property which we can use as an alternative. The results when
looking at the paradoxes are satisfactory in that undesirable conclusions are
not derivable using the lexicographic closure algorithm. There is also a way
to identify which obligations are violated by a fact in the paradoxes, via the
lexicographic closure algorithm’s consistency check, but there is still a lack





In this chapter, we analyse the efficacy of PTL’s LM-entailment reasoning
method in the deontic domain. We start by detailing the chosen represen-
tation method and then investigate which of the deontic properties can be
applied once converted to their PTL translations. The chapter then moves
onto the analysis of the paradoxes which involves translating the paradoxes
into PTL and applying the LM-entailment algorithm to produce the LM-
entailment model which we can reason with.
8.1 Representation
Due to the expressiveness of PTL, settling on a representation for PTL state-
ments was a harder task than finding the representation with the KLM lan-
guage. The following sections present the representation and the intuition
behind its selection. If there is a deontic scenario that guided the represen-
tation, we show the models for this example, given by the LM-entailment
algorithm, and how the representation changed because of them. It is im-
portant to note that we restrict ourselves to the use of only a subset of PTL.
Before determining the final representation, we begin by only allowing PTL
statements of the form, •↵ !   or •↵ ! • , where ↵ and   could be any
formulas from the propositional logic language. The reason being that the ex-
amples we deal with can be represented reasonably with this limited language
and this limiting also reduces the complexity of the analysis. Statements of
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the form ↵ ! •  do not carry the intuition we desire, since we do not want
the properties of  , whether they are the most typical or otherwise, to apply
to all ↵ valuations. So we desire that the bullet operator be present on the
antecedent side at least. Now we move on to determine which of •↵ !  
and •↵ ! •  we are to use for representation.
8.1.1 Bullet operator on both sides?
PTL has similar semantics to the semantics of DSDL and KLM-style defea-
sible reasoning in that its valuations are ranked by some order of preference.
Thus we begin the search for a representation method by adopting the same
translation used in chapter 7. Recall from definition 5.2 that we can translate
any KLM style conditional to a PTL formula as we can go from the ↵ |⇠   to
•↵ !   and retain the same reading. The PTL statement would be “the most
typical ↵ are  ” which holds the same intuition as the KLM-style version,
“↵ typically implies  ”. This KLM-equivalent version tells us that the most
typical ↵-valuations have to be any  -valuations and this seems reasonable.
But we have already examined this representation in chapter 7 and thus wish
to explore the added expressive capabilities provided by PTL but wish to do
so without sacrificing an intuitive interpretation of the obligations. So the
question we ask is whether having the typicality bullet operator on both sides
of the implication arrow, instead of only on the antecedent side, provides a
sensible reading of the obligations.
We would represent the obligations as •↵ ! •  and read them as “the most
typical ↵’s are the most typical  ’s”. This tells us that the most typical sit-
uations where one is late must be among the most typical situations where
one apologises. This adds a further constraint to the obligation as we require
scenarios where ↵ holds, to be such that no other scenario where   holds
should be more typical. Both versions of the obligation seem reasonable, but
the representation with bullets on both sides gives us a more specific version
of obligation. This suggests that having the bullets on both sides provides a
sufficiently satisfactory representation for obligations and with this in mind,
we proceed with this both-side representation. We initially wished to explore
the added expressiveness of PTL and the reading of the obligations seems
adequate to justify the use of this representation.
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8.1.2 Exceptions
We look at the handling of exceptions using the current PTL representation
up to this point in the chapter. During this section, we revisit the Student
example introduced in section 7.3. It is an example of having a contrary-to-
duty obligation with an exception and when reasoning, ideally, the exception
would be more plausible than a violation. Below are the statements of the
Student example: “Students must not pay taxes” and “Students who work
must pay taxes”. Here are the PTL equivalents of the statements.
{•s ! •¬t, •(s ^ w) ! •t}.




We strip the model of valuations where ¬s holds, by assuming the fact s
holds, as scenarios with no student are not of interest for this example. The
model shows that there is an equal preference for both valuations where a
student is paying taxes whether or not they are working. This is undesirable
as the exceptional statement “a student is working and therefore should pay
taxes” should be a more plausible scenario than the violation “a student
pays taxes when they are not working and therefore must not do so”. For
that to be the case, the valuation {s, t,¬w} would need to be a level higher
than the valuation {s, t, w}, whereas they are currently on the same level of
preference. This is because of the statement •(s ^ w) ! •t which asserts
that the best valuations where there is a student who pays taxes, have to be
valuations where the student is working, however, the converse need not be
true. The below figure shows the model if we instead represent the statement





The change from the one-sided implication ! to the if-and-only-if double
implication $ provides us with a different reading. In general, if we have
the non-conditional obligation of ¬  and have that ↵ is an exception to it,
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then this means that   is obligated to be the case whenever ↵ is true. Now
conversely, can we say that if the violation for the non-conditional obligation
holds, that is that   holds, then the exception ↵ is obligated to be true as
well? The change to the if-and-only-if double implication, $, in the second
obligation will push the valuation {s, t,¬w} up a level. This causes it to
be less preferred than the situation where a student who pays taxes is also
a working student. So in a technical sense, this seems to be an adequate
method of representing those obligations that have exceptions. The model
states that the exceptions should simply be preferred to ordinary violations
and this seems reasonable. The reading that if you are paying taxes then you
should be a working student seems less so but it is a result of the information
we have, as all that is known about taxpayers in the scenario is that they can
only be a working student. Let us look at a different version of the example
which generates the same result. If the statements are •s ! •¬t, “the most
typical students are the most typical non-taxpayers”, and •w $ •t, “the most
typical workers are the most typical taxpayers”, then the model with the all
valuations included is given below.
R⇤KB
2 {s,¬t,w}, {s,t,¬w}, {¬s,t,¬w}, {¬s,¬t,w}
1 {s,t,w}, {¬s,t,w}
0 {s,¬t,¬w}, {¬s,¬t,¬w}
Now if we look at the model, it states the ideal scenario where you pay taxes
is one when where you are working and vice versa. This provides a more
intuitive reading and if we remove the valuations where there is no student
then the model will be equivalent to the initial Student example model from
above. Thus the representation rule would state that we should use the
double implication operator to represent contrary-to-duty obligations with
exceptions. Note that this exceptions representation creates an underlying
logical equivalency between statements such as “if ↵ then   is obligatory”
and “if   then ↵ is obligatory”, which represents a drawback to its use.
8.1.3 Representation summary
These are the following rules to follow to translate a deontic statement,  (  |
↵) into a PTL statement. We would do this for all obligations within the
deontic knowledge base we are translating.
1. Convert statements such as  (  | ↵) to •↵ ! • . Note that if we have
a non-conditional obligation, let’s say   , then the antecedent will be
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the tautology >. So then the non-conditional obligation,  (  | >) or
more succinctly  ( ), can be represented with •> ! • .
2. If the statement represents an exceptional contrary-to-duty obligation
to another obligation let’s say  (  | ↵) then the PTL statement will
become •↵ $ • . We state that an exceptional contrary-to-duty obli-
gation for the obligation  (  | ↵) would be a statement where the an-
tecedent is not one of {>,?,↵,¬↵,  ,¬ }, and the consequent would
imply ¬ .
There may also be facts in the to-be-translated knowledge base and we rep-
resent these in the usual way. With the way of representing deontic scenarios
chosen, the analysis process can continue to the properties stage.
8.2 Properties
We now explore the extent to which the properties detailed in section 2 apply
in our restricted PTL environment. We are not assessing whether these prop-
erties are generally satisfied by PTL for all types of statements and scenarios.
In particular, we want to determine whether these properties are applicable
to obligations of a similar form to those translated using the representation
method we have settled upon. With there being various ways that we can
represent an obligation in PTL, we will look at how we can apply each prop-
erty for particular representations of obligations.
For this section, we will make use of the stronger notion of the statements be-
ing within the knowledge base, instead of just being entailed by the knowledge
base, in preparation for the paradox analysis. This is due to the paradoxes’
statements being part of the knowledge bases and not just entailed by them.
8.2.1 Ought Implies Can Principle
We mentioned in the discussion of this principle in chapter 7 that while work-
ing with obligations, we wish to state explicitly whether a certain fact brings
up a violation. This would require the logic system used to allow a conflict,
but this is not the case when we use PTL. Let’s say we have a knowledge
base that contains the conditionals •> ! •↵ and •> ! •¬↵. There will be
no valuations that satisfy the knowledge base because of the conflicting con-
ditionals, therefore we cannot reason with this knowledge base. This implies
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that we have the “ought implies can” principle. In deontic form, we represent
this with the derivation of ¬   (↵ ^ ¬↵). A benefit of this, just as with
the KLM approach, is that we cannot have the previously discussed issue of
deontic explosion.
Since having contradictory facts in the knowledge base causes a conflict, we
will not have any facts in the knowledge base when using the LM-entailment
algorithm to construct the LM-entailment model. These facts we omit from
the knowledge base will be the facts not considered being background knowl-
edge. But similarly to the previous section, we can observe which obligations
a certain fact violates by checking each obligation against the fact. When
there is an inconsistency and thus no valuations that satisfy the knowledge
base, that indicates that we can check the obligations to determine which
have been violated. After determining the violated obligations, we will then
use facts after the LM-entailment algorithm constructs the ranked model. For
example, if we have the knowledge base such as {•> ! •↵, •> ! • ,¬ },
which has two obligations and a single fact, we will construct the LM-
entailment model using only the subset {•> ! •↵, •> ! • }. We approach
dealing with exceptional obligations in the same manner. We take any back-
ground knowledge, let’s say ↵ !   for this example, into account during
the LM-entailment model construction. Then when we are checking for the
derivation of an obligation with ¬↵ as the premise, let’s say we are examin-
ing whether we can derive ¬↵ !  , we introduce the fact in the following
manner. We will strip valuations from the LM-entailment model that con-
tradict our fact and then reason with the resultant model. Thus we are now
reasoning knowing that this fact has occurred and we do not want to deal
with scenarios which contradict it. The intuition is that the model conveys
the best-case scenario if an obligation has been violated.
8.2.2 Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
We present an example to illustrate the issue with having the Restricted
Strengthening of the Antecedent property with our given representation.
Let’s say we have the following obligations: “You should not drive under
the influence” and “You should have a driver’s license”. Additionally, there
is the fact “You drive under the influence”. Observe the following derivation.
|= d,KB |⇡  l
KB |⇡  (l | d)
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Since d is a tautology we have > ! d, and the derivation can be thought of
as an instance of the Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent property
being applied. We include the derived obligation, “If you drive under the
influence you should have a driver’s license”, in the knowledge base and as
previously mentioned, omit the fact from the knowledge base.
{ ¬d, (l | d), l}
This set of obligations seems reasonable and intuitively consistent. The jus-
tification being that if you must do two separate things and then you violate
one of them, you are still obligated to do the other. This example, rather,
provides a technical issue in PTL. When we use our PTL representation,
then the above example cannot be adequately modelled by:
{•> ! •¬d, •d ! •l, •> ! •l}
Here we have that the most typical situations are those where both ¬d and
l hold. We also have that the most typical situations where d holds should
be the most typical situations where l holds. The latter’s reading does not
seem as reasonable when taking into account the previous two. Technically,
this set of PTL statements results in a model where it is not possible to
have the most typical d-valuations be the most typical l-valuations as the
most typical valuations of the entire model have to be not only l-valuations
but also ¬d-valuations. This leaves us with the following model where we
have scenarios where d holds being given an infinite rank thus being seen as
impossible scenarios. This leaves us with the potential to derive anything if
we use d as a premise, akin to deontic explosion.
R⇤KB
1 {d, l}, {d,¬l}
1 {¬d,¬l}
0 {¬d, l}
This issue results from the statement •d ! •l. It is a contrary-to-duty
obligation to •> ! •¬d and while noting that the most typical valuations
must satisfy l along with ¬d, we can see that the obligation •d ! •l cannot
obligate the occurrence of the most typical l situations as it violates the
most typical valuations satisfying ¬d. This suggests there needs to be an
adjustment to the Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent property to
avoid situations such as these, without disregarding the property entirely. We
use the Rational Monotonicity property, previously discussed in chapter 3,
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to guide us in devising such a property. Once again, the property in deontic
logic would look like the following.
KB |⇡  (  | ↵),KB |⇡ ¬  (¬  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵ ^  )
Now we revisit the example’s deontic knowledge base, { ¬d, l}, which has
the derived obligation  (l | d) removed to observe whether we can derive
it with this alternative property inspired by Rational Monotonicity. The
above property tells us that if we wish to derive  (l | d) from  l then we
must not have  ¬d in the knowledge base. Since that is not the case, we
get the desired result of blocking the derivation of  (l | d). The statement
KB |⇡ ¬   (¬  | ↵) tells us that from the knowledge base it does not
follow that given ↵, there is an obligation to do ¬ . This says that given ↵
being true then   is permitted. The PTL equivalent to this deontic formula
is ¬(•↵ ! •¬ ). We now continue to examine what the LM-entailment
model tells about this property. For this property, we assume that we have a
knowledge base that contains the obligation  (q | p), and does not contain
 (¬r | p), where p, q and r are propositional letters. We want to check if we
can derive  (q | p ^ r) when using the LM-entailment model.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q}. Ideally,
we want to derive •(p ^ r) ! •q in the case where r holds and below
is the LM-entailment model R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r},{p,q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r}
When r holds, the most typical p^ r-valuation is also the most typical
q-valuation thus we can derive •(p ^ r) ! •q. This is possible since
we do not have that •p ! •¬r (or •p $ •¬r) in the knowledge base.
Including this obligation would have lifted the lowest p^r-valuation up
the model and made the most typical q-valuation become a valuation
where only one of p and r are true. This derivation of •(p ^ r) ! •q
would also be blocked if we had •(p ^ r) ! •¬q or •¬(p ^ r) ! •q
included in the knowledge base.
2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q}. Ideally,
we want to derive •(p ^ r) ! •q in the case where r holds. The model
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for this case would be similar to the model of the above case, but with
the valuations that have ¬p^q being true, which are the {¬p, q, r} and
{¬p, q,¬r}, moved up a level. The fact remains that the most typical
p^r-valuation is also the most typical q-valuation while we do not have
•p ! •¬r (or •p $ •¬r) in the knowledge base. The addition of this
obligation would have the same effect as in the above case. Below is
the LM-entailment model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, r}
0 {p,q, r},{p,q, ¬r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}
We can therefore see that our alternative to the Restricted Strengthening
of the Antecedent for PTL can be applied while using the LM-entailment
model.
8.2.3 Weakening
KB |⇡  (  ^   | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains
 (q ^ r | p) where p, q and r are propositional letters. We want to check if
 (q | p) can be derived when using the LM-entailment model.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •(q ^ r)}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •q. Below is the LM-entailment model,
R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r}
The most typical p-valuation is the most typical q-valuation and is also
the most typical r-valuation therefore we can derive both •p ! •q and
•p ! •r. Note that this will not always be the case as we can have, for
example, that the best q-valuation be a ¬r-valuation and vice versa for
the best r-valuation. This would mean the best p ^ q-valuation would
not be the best q-valuation or the best r-valuation.
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2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •(q ^ r)}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •q. This model is the same as the
above case except the following valuation, {¬p, q, r}, is pushed up a
level. So we can still derive both •p ! •q and •p ! •r. This same
note on applicability as above applies here. Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {p,q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r}
The Weakening property is applicable to both ordinary obligations and those
that represent exceptions, under certain circumstances. The property does
not hold generally as it is not always the case that •(q ^ r) ! •q.
8.2.4 Deontic Detachment
KB |⇡  (  | ↵),KB |⇡  ↵
KB |⇡   
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains
at least  (q | p) and  p where p, q and r are propositional letters. We
want to check the derivability of  q when using the LM-entailment model.
There are only two cases to consider as the case with two non-conditional
obligations is trivial.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q, •> ! •p}.




The most typical valuation is {p, q} so we can derive •> ! •q.
2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •> ! •p}.
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As in the above case, the most typical valuation is {p, q} thus •> ! •q
can be derived.
The Deontic Detachment property is applicable to both scenarios where we
have a non-conditional obligation and another obligation, ordinary or excep-
tional.
8.2.5 Factual Detachment
KB |⇡  (  | ↵), |= ↵
KB |⇡   
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains at
least  (q | p) and the fact p where p, q and r are propositional letters. We
want to check the derivability of  q when using the LM-entailment model.
There are only three cases to look at as the non-conditional obligation check
is trivial.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q}. Ideally,
we want to derive •> ! •q in the case where p holds. Below is the
LM-entailment model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q}
0 {p,q}, {¬p,q}, {¬p,¬q}
When p is true, the most typical valuation is {p, q} therefore the desired
derivation of •> ! •q holds.
2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q}. Ideally,




When we have p, the most typical valuation is {p, q} and we can derive
•> ! •q.
Given a fact p, we can see that Factual Detachment is applicable to both
types of obligations we deal with.
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8.2.6 Distribution
If |= ↵ !  , then KB |⇡  ↵ !   
Recall that this tells us that if we have a fact which states ↵ implies  , if we
have that one is obligated to do ↵ then one is also obligated to do  . So using
the chosen PTL representation for this property, we assume we have ↵ !  
as a tautology and the non-conditional obligation •> ! •↵ in the knowledge
base. The question is whether we can derive •> ! • . We have the following
knowledge base, {•> ! •p, p ! q} where p and q are propositional letters.
Ideally, we want to derive •> ! •q. The fact p ! q means we cannot have
the valuation {p,¬q} in the LM-entailment model when we assume the fact




We can derive •> ! •q, as the most typical valuation in the model is {p, q}
and we therefore have the Distribution property with our given representa-
tion.
8.2.7 Conjunction
KB |⇡  (  | ↵),KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  ^   | ↵)
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains
at least  (q | p) and  (r | p) where p, q and r are propositional letters. We
want to check the derivability of  (q ^ r | p) when using the LM-entailment
model.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q, •p ! •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •(q ^ r). Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r}
We can see that the most typical p-valuation is {p, q, r} so we can derive
•p ! •(q ^ r).
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2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •p ! •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •(q ^ r). Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {p,q, ¬r},{¬p,q, ¬r},{¬p,q, r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}
Again. {p, q, r} is the most typical p-valuation, so we can derive •p !
•(q ^ r).
3. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •p $ •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •(q ^ r). Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r}, {p,q, ¬r},{¬p,q, ¬r},{¬p,q, r},{¬p,¬q, r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}
{p, q, r} is the most typical p-valuation so we can derive •p ! •(q ^ r).
The Conjunction property is applicable to the various combinations of our
obligation types.
8.2.8 Disjunction
KB |⇡  (  |  ),KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵ _  )
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains
at least  (q | p) and  (r | p) where p, q and r are propositional letters. We
want to check the derivability of  (q | r _ p) when using the LM-entailment
model.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q, •r ! •q}.
Ideally, we want to derive •(p _ r) ! •q. Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}, {¬p,q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r}
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The most typical p-valuations are also the most typical q-valuations.
We also have {p, q, r} and {¬p, q, r} as the most typical r-valuations
therefore •(p _ r) ! •q holds.
2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •r ! •q}.
Ideally, we want to derive •(p _ r) ! •q. Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r},{¬p,q, r},{¬p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r}
We have {p, q, r} and {p, q,¬r} as the most typical p-valuations with
the former being the most typical r-valuation. Both are the most typ-
ical q-valuation therefore •(p _ r) ! •q holds.
3. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •r $ •q}.
Ideally, we want to derive •(p _ r) ! •q. Below is the LM-entailment
model, R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r},{¬p,q, r},{¬p,q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}
The most typical p-valuation and most typical r-valuation is {p, q, r}
so •(p _ r) ! •q holds.
Similarly to the Conjunction property, given our combinations of obligation
types, the Disjunction property is one we can still apply.
8.2.9 Transitivity
KB |⇡  (  |  ),KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
KB |⇡  (  | ↵)
For this property, we assume that we have a knowledge base that contains
at least  (q | p) and  (r | q) where p, q and r are propositional letters.
We want to check the derivability of  (r | p) when using the LM-entailment
model.
1. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p ! •q, •q ! •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •r. Below is the LM-entailment model,
R⇤KB.
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1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r},{¬p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r}
We have the most typical p-valuation being the most typical r-valuation
so •p ! •r can be derived.
2. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •q ! •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •r. Below is the LM-entailment model,
R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,q, r},{¬p,q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r}
{p, q, r} is the most typical p-valuation so we can derive •p ! •r.
3. Let’s say we have the following knowledge base, {•p $ •q, •q $ •r}.
Ideally, we want to derive •p ! •r. Below is the LM-entailment model,
R⇤KB.
1 {p,¬q, r},{p,¬q, ¬r},{¬p,¬q, r},{¬p,q, r},{¬p,q, ¬r},{p,q, ¬r}
0 {p,q, r}, {¬p,¬q, ¬r}
We can derive •p ! •r since the most typical p-valuation is the most
typical r-valuation.
Given the combinations of obligation types, we have that the Transitivity
property can be derived within the LM-entailment model.
8.2.10 Conclusions
We observe that we can apply most of the properties within PTL under
specific scenarios. Instead of having the Restricted Strengthening of the
Antecedent property with our given representation, we use an alternative
property inspired by the Rational Monotonicity property of the KLM ap-
proach. With the general satisfaction of the properties within PTL still to
be checked, analysis of the properties that are held within the underlying
logic could also be valuable. We proceed to examine how the properties
interact in the LM-entailment models of the paradoxes.
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8.3 Paradoxes
The following section details the results of reasoning about the paradoxes
using LM-entailment. The LM-entailment models are constructed using the
LM-entailment algorithm on knowledge bases translated to the PTL language
with the chosen PTL representation method. A reminder that the desired
interpretation for the paradoxes, since we have “ought implies can” principle,
is for conflicts to be unwanted. We rather aim to find the obligation to act
as best as possible once a violation has been committed [21, 23].
8.3.1 Forrester’s paradox
Recall that this paradox comprises the following three statements: “You must
not kill anybody”, “If you kill someone then you must kill them gently” and
“You killed someone ”. There is also the background knowledge that states
that “Killing gently implies killing”. Along with the following set of PTL
statements comes the translated version of the background knowledge, g ! k,
and the fact k. We assume the background knowledge to hold throughout
while we consider the fact to hold when we attempt to determine actual
obligations.
{•> ! •¬k, •k ! •g}
The violated obligation is •> ! •¬k as no valuation could satisfy a knowl-
edge base which has both the fact k and this obligation. The LM-entailment





From the background knowledge g ! k, we have that the valuation {g,¬k}
cannot be in the model. The model tells us that the most typical of all
scenarios is when there has been no killing, gently or otherwise. The next
most plausible scenario is when one has killed gently and the least plausible is
where one killed but did not to do so gently. We now present the evaluation
of the paradox’s problematic derivations.
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Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1.  ¬k !W  ¬g
2.  ¬g !RSA  (¬g | k)
3. { (¬g | k), (g | k)} !Conj  (¬g ^ g | k)
The Weakening property allows for the derivation of  ¬g from  ¬k which
is reasonable. Working with the LM-entailment model R⇤KB, we can go from
•> ! •¬k to •> ! •¬g as the model shows that the most typical valuation
is not only a ¬k-valuation but also satisfies ¬g. This mimics the deontic
derivation using the Weakening property. But unlike in the above derivations,
one cannot derive  (¬g | k) from using Restricted Strengthening of the
Antecedent. Using our PTL alternative to Restricted Strengthening of the
Antecedent, the presence of the statement •> ! •¬k blocks •k ! •¬g from
being derived. We can see this in the model as the best k valuations are g
valuations in this model and thus cannot be a ¬g-valuation.
Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (g | k), k} !FD  g
2. { ¬k,  g} !Conj  (¬k ^ g)
The first derivation where the Factual Detachment property allows for the
derivation of  g from the pair  (g | k) and the fact k, is also possible in the
LM-entailment model. When we assume k, the valuations where ¬k holds
are stripped from the model which leaves us with the following model. Here
we get •> ! •g as an actual obligation, which represents the obligation  g,




This model shows us that once we have assumed that a killing has occurred
that the derivation of •> ! •¬k is blocked, and thus the problematic deriva-
tion of •> ! •(¬k ^ g) is avoided when we assume k.
8.3.2 Chisholm’s paradox
Recall that this paradox comprises the following four statements: “Jones
must go assist his neighbour”, “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour then he
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must tell them that he is coming”, “If Jones does not go to assist his neighbour
then he must not tell them that he is coming” and “Jones does not go to assist
his neighbour”. Along with the following set of PTL statements comes the
fact ¬a.
{•> ! •a, •a ! •t, •¬a ! •¬t}
The LM-entailment algorithm constructs the following model of valuations.
The violated obligation is •> ! •a as no valuation could satisfy a knowledge
base which has both the fact ¬a and this obligation.
R⇤KB
2 {¬a , t}
1 {¬a , ¬t},{a, ¬t}
0 {a , t}
We observe that the most typical situation is where Jones goes to assist
and tells his neighbour that he is coming to assist. At a less typical level,
we have the scenario where Jones does not go assist and does not tell his
neighbour as well as the scenario where Jones goes to assist but does not tell
his neighbour. The least plausible scenario is when Jones does not go assist
yet tells his neighbour that he is coming to assist. Note that the obligation
•a ! •t is no longer necessary and is implied by the other two. This is due
to the most typical a valuation automatically becoming the best t valuation
from •> ! •a and •¬a ! •¬t. This is certainly an undesirable scenario
given by the representation we use. The obligation for Jones to go, and the
obligation which states how he should act if he does not go, should have no
bearing how he should act if he goes to assist [5].
Deontic Detachment, Factual Detachment and Conjunction
1. { (t | a),  a} !DD  t
2. { (¬t | ¬a), ¬a} !FD  ¬t
3. { t, ¬t} !Conj  t ^ ¬t
When we take ¬a, “Jones does not go to assist his neighbour”, as a fact, we
get the following model with the valuations where a holds being stripped
away.
R⇤KB
1 {¬a , t}
0 {¬a , ¬t}
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We can still derive  ¬t, •> ! •¬t, such as with Factual Detachment
but the Deontic Detachment derivation of  t, •> ! •t, is blocked. This
is because of the two obligations •> ! •a and •a ! •t, which say “Jones
must go assist his neighbour” and “If Jones goes to assist his neighbour then
he must tell them that he is coming” respectively, not being derivable.
Transitivity and Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent
1. { (t | a),  a} !Trans  t
2.  t !RSA  (t | ¬a)
3. { (t | ¬a), (¬t | ¬a)} !Conj  (t ^ ¬t | ¬a)
We can use the Transitivity property to go from the two obligations  (t | a)
and  a to the non-conditional obligation  t. And we can still perform
this derivation as we can derive •> ! •t since {a, t} is the most typical
valuation in the model. But the derivation of  (t | ¬a) from  t via the
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent property is blocked while using
the alternative property because we have  a in the knowledge base. The
obligation  (t | ¬a) would be •¬a ! •t in PTL, which is blocked in the
model as the most typical valuation that satisfies ¬a is a valuation where ¬t
holds.
8.3.3 Fence paradox
Recall that this paradox comprises the following four statements: “There
must not be a fence”, “If there is a fence then it must be a white fence”, “If
there is a dog then there must be a white fence” and “There is a fence”. Along
with the following set of PTL statements comes the fact f .
{•> ! •¬f, •f ! •(f ^ w), •d $ •(f ^ w)}
The LM-entailment algorithm constructs the following model of valuations.
The violated obligation is •> ! •¬f , as no valuation could satisfy a knowl-
edge base which has both this obligation and the fact f .
R⇤KB
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Note that this paradox is analogous to the Student example in section 8.1.2.
The valuations where there is not a dog or a fence are the most typical.
On the next level, we have the exceptional case of a dog being present and
therefore we require a white fence to be present as well. Observe that the
valuation where there is a white fence with no dog has a rank of two and
is one of the least typical valuations. When we take the fact f to be true,




We can see that the least typical valuations are the ones where there is
either a white fence with no dog present, or a fence which is not white and
the presence of a dog is irrelevant. The wanted derivation in this example
would be to have  (f^w | d) be considered more typical than  (f^w | ¬d)
and this can be seen in the model. This tells us that when there is a violation
of the non-conditional obligation to not have a fence, that it is because we
have a scenario where the exception, there being a dog, has occurred. Recall
that we wanted the presence of a white fence, meaning that f ^ w holds,
to imply that there is a dog present, d also holds. In PTL we can derive
•(f ^ w) ! •d, due to our translation of the exceptional obligations, which
is what we initially desired.
8.3.4 Trump/Kim paradox
Recall that this paradox comprises the following four statements: “Trump
must not be told the secret”, “Kim must not be told the secret”, “If you tell
Trump then you must tell Kim“ and ”If you tell Kim then you must tell
Trump”. We translate the obligations into the following set of PTL state-
ments. We are treating the latter two obligations as exceptions and therefore
use the $ representation. This means we only need to have one of these
obligations in the knowledge base.
{•> ! •¬t, •> ! •¬k, •t $ •k}
The LM-entailment algorithm constructs the following model of valuations.
The most typical scenario is when neither of the men are told the secret and
the next most typical states that they should both be told the secret. The
least plausible situations have only one of Trump and Kim being told the
secret.
Chapter 8 78
Enriching deontic logic with typicality
R⇤KB
2 {t,¬k}, {¬t, k}
1 {t, k}
0 {¬t,¬k}
Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent, Weakening and Con-
junction
1. { ¬t, ¬k} !Conj  (¬t ^ ¬k)
2.  (¬t ^ ¬k) !W  ¬(t ^ k)
3.  ¬(t ^ k) !RSA  (¬(t ^ k) | t)
4. { (¬(t ^ k) | t), (t ^ k | t} !Conj  (¬(t ^ k) ^ t ^ k | t)
We can derive •> ! •(¬t ^ ¬k) from the above LM-entailment model as
the most typical valuation in the model is {¬t,¬k}. This represents the
first derivation using Conjunction in the above table. We can then derive
•> ! •¬(t ^ k), which is the application of the Weakening property in
the table. The derivation via Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent is
blocked by our alternative in this case since •> ! ¬ • t is in our knowledge




When t is true then one cannot derive •t ! •¬(t ^ k) since the most
typical valuation where t is true is a t ^ k-valuation.
8.3.5 Van Fraassen’s paradox
Recall that this paradox comprises the following two statements: “You must
honour your father or honour your mother” and “You must not honour your
mother”. The translated obligations are in the following PTL set.
{•> ! •(f _m), •> ! •¬m}
The LM-entailment algorithm constructs the following model of valuations.
Of the four valuations, the most typical tells us that only the father has been
honoured while the remaining cases are less typical.
1 {f,m}, {¬f,m}, {¬f,¬m}
0 {f,¬m}
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Weakening and Conjunction
1. { (f _m),  ¬m} !Conj  (f ^ ¬m)
2.  (f ^ ¬m) !W  f
The paradox’s problematic derivation involves the Weakening and Conjunc-
tion properties. We can derive the desired obligation  f , which is •> ! •f
in PTL, from this model as the most typical of all the valuations is {f,¬m}.
Note that we cannot introduce the obligation •> ! •m otherwise there
would be a conflict, hence the deontic explosion issue is blocked.
In the alphabetic variant of Van Fraassen’s paradox, the Apples-and Pears
example, we have the following PTL obligation set which translates the two
obligations “You must buy apples or buy pears” and “You mustn’t buy apples”.
{•> ! •(a _ p), •> ! •¬a}
The LM-entailment algorithm constructs the following model of valuations.
Much like the Van Fraassen example, the model tells us that the most typ-
ical scenario is when pears have been bought with no apples bought. The
remaining valuations are all less plausible.
R⇤KB
1 {p, a}, {¬p, a}, {¬p,¬a}
0 {p,¬a}
We give this variant’s problematic derivation, detailed in section 4.4.
1. { a _ p, ¬a} !Conj  ¬a ^ p
2.  ¬a ^ p !W  p
3.  p !RSA  (p | a)
We can derive the desired obligation •> ! •p but the derivation of the
conditional obligation •a ! •p, through Restricted Strengthening of the
Antecedent, is blocked. This derivation is blocked because the most typical
valuations where a is true, {p, a} and {¬p, a}, are on the same level but only
one satisfies p. Besides this, there is a valuation where p is true which is more
typical than both {p, a} and {¬p, a}, with that valuation being {p,¬a}.
8.4 Conclusion
Similarly to the KLM approach, we have an intuitive method of representa-
tion with the use of PTL’s bullet operator. We translate an obligation such
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as  (  | ↵) into •↵ ! • . We also have a representation for exceptions
with the use of the double implication, $, to modify a translated PTL obli-
gation into an exceptional obligation. We represent exceptional obligations
with PTL formulas such as •↵ $ • . And we show the deontic properties
to be reasonably applicable under certain conditions except for Restricted
Strengthening of the Antecedent, which causes an issue with our given rep-
resentation. But the adoption of a property similar to the KLM approach’s
Rational Monotonicity gave a viable alternative to Restricted Strengthening
of the Antecedent for use during the analysis of the paradoxes. Although
the properties are fairly applicable, there is the lack of general satisfaction in
PTL. Thus it is important to use the PTL representation carefully. Similar
to the handling of the paradoxes with the KLM approach, the undesirable
derivations are blocked while using LM-entailment. This also includes the is-
sues given in the Fence paradox, as there is a way to represent the exceptions
explicitly. Despite having the “ought implies can” principle, we can detect vi-
olations, with a similar method to that used in chapter 7, using a consistency





In this chapter, we study the use of the PT-entailment method in a deon-
tic environment. Recall that the PT-entailment method involves the con-
struction of models in addition to the single LM-entailment model if this is
possible. Similarly to the previous chapter, we first determine how to rep-
resent the deontic statements. Then we detail how the properties which we
checked in the previous chapter also apply for PT-entailment. Thereafter,
we analyse specially constructed deontic examples since we cannot analyse
the paradoxes for reasons detailed in section 9.3.
9.1 Representation
Since we are using the same logic language, that of PTL, we will retain
the same representation from the LM-entailment chapter since it has an
intuitive reading which we are satisfied with. Therefore, we use the same
representation method from the LM-entailment chapter during the analysis
in this chapter. Thus we translate obligations such as  (  | ↵) into PTL
formulas such as •↵ ! • . The representation of exceptions using the double
implication arrow, $, is also carried over from the LM-entailment chapter.
So we represent exceptional obligations using statements such as •↵ $ • .
Facts also keep their usual representation.
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9.2 Properties
The LM-entailment models, which we used to investigate the applicability
of the properties in the previous chapter, have all their valuations being as
low as possible in the models. In other words, the valuations are as typical
as possible, which signifies that we cannot produce additional models for the
PT-entailment method. We can then use those single LM-entailment models
to check the properties. For the sake of brevity, we avoid reassessing these
LM-entailment models and instead carry over the properties from chapter 8
to this PT-entailment analysis. Intuitively, we state that we can apply these
properties in deontic scenarios in a similar manner for both LM-entailment
and PT-entailment.
9.3 Paradoxes
Ideally, we would continue this analysis with the already-presented para-
doxes as we have established how to interpret their shortcomings and ideal
solutions. However, when dealing with the paradoxes, the LM-entailment
models rank the valuations as typically as possible. This means that the set
of minimal models produced by the PT-entailment method will only contain
the single LM-entailment model. Therefore, our PT-entailment derivations
would be identical to that of LM-entailment for the paradoxes. Because of
this, we constructed examples that are meant to be both representative of
deontic intuition and facilitate the production of multiple models, in addi-
tion to the single LM-entailment model, by the PT-entailment method. The
results of these examples can then demonstrate the differences between the
derivations of LM-entailment and PT-entailment. For the detection of viola-
tions, we apply the same method from chapter 8 when we are presented with
a fact. We then assess how PT-entailment handles these novel problems.
9.3.1 Contrary-to-duty example
The first example is a simple contrary-to-duty scenario. The PTL knowledge
base we have is {•> ! •¬l, •l ! •a}. We can read these obligations as “You
should not be late for work” and “If you are late then you must apologise”. The
PT-entailment models are now given with the 1-ranked valuations omitted
and R1 being the LM-entailment model.
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R1 0 {¬l,¬a}, {¬l, a}
R2
2 {l,¬a}
1 {l, a},{¬l, a}
0 {¬l,¬a}
The most problematic LM-entailment derivation, via the model R1, is
that ¬l is a tautology. This is a fact that tells us that “You are not late” and
this is clearly too strong of a derivation considering the obligations we have.
But with PT-entailment, this fact cannot be derived since R2 does not entail
¬l being a tautology as there are valuations that satisfy l. There is another
issue from R1 and that is the ability to derive anything when we have •l as
the antecedent. The reason being that there are no valuations that satisfy l,
which allows us to conclude whatever obligation we wish if we use l as our
premise. This is akin to the undesirable deontic explosion principle discussed
in various parts of the dissertation. Recall this when a violation allows one
to derive any obligation from a knowledge base. The conditional obligation
•l ! •a, which we deem desirable and states that “if you are late then you
must apologise”, from PT-entailment while blocking the explosion when •l is
the antecedent. Using R1, we can also derive •a ! •¬l which tells us that
“If you apologise then you must not be late to work” which certainly does not
align with our intuition. If there is a situation where one has to apologise
then ideally they would be a latecomer. PT-entailment blocks this as the
most typical valuations where a is true are {l, a} and {¬l, a} so we can only
derive •a ! •(¬l _ l) which is more reasonable.
9.3.2 Extended contrary-to-duty example
We proceed with contrary-to-duty example that we consider an extension
of the standard form with two obligations. This example has additional
complexity in the linking of the contrary-to-duty obligations to the non-
conditional obligation. Let’s say we have the knowledge base {•> ! •(s ^
¬p), •¬s ! •¬f, •p ! •f}. We can read these obligations as “You should
have a student card and should not park on campus”, “If you do not have a
student card then you should not pay a fine” and “If you park on campus then
you should pay a fine”. This example has two contrary-to-duty statements
which have contradictory consequents. The PT-entailment models are now
given with the 1-ranked valuations omitted and R1 being the LM-entailment
model.
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R1 0 {¬f, s,¬p}, {f, s,¬p}
R2
2. {f,¬s,¬p}
1. {¬f, s,¬p}, {¬f,¬s,¬p}
0. {f, s,¬p}
R3
2. {¬f, s, p}
1. {f, s, p}, {f, s,¬p}
0. {¬f, s,¬p}
We can derive both s and ¬p as tautologies from the LM-entailment model,
R1, which are facts that read as “You have a student card” and “You did not
park”. These are further instances of LM-entailment producing too strong a
derivation in a contrary-to-duty scenario. And we can see that even in this
extended example, the additional PT-entailment models block the deriva-
tions of facts from the sole LM-entailment model. Then similarly to the
contrary-to-duty example in the previous section, if we have •¬p or •s as the
antecedent, we could derive any conditional obligation via deontic explosion.
The presence of valuations where p and ¬s both hold within the additional
PT-entailment models prevents the deontic explosion of obligations. In R1,
we can derive •¬f ! •s which reads as “If you do not pay a fine then you
should have a student card”. This reading is not intuitive as it is ideal for
situations where one does not pay a fine, to be situations where they do not
have a student card. This cannot be derived with PT-entailment as we have
that the most typical ¬f valuations in R2 are {¬f, s,¬p} and {¬f,¬s,¬p}.
The latter valuation means we cannot derive •¬f ! •s.
9.3.3 Exception example
The following is a slight variation of the contrary-to-duty form with the
inclusion on an exceptional obligation. Let’s say we have the knowledge base
{•> ! •¬p, •p $ •d, •p ! •f}. We read these obligations as “You should
not park on campus”, “If you have a parking disc then you should park on
campus” and “If you park on campus then you should pay a fine”. The PT-
entailment models are now given with the 1-ranked valuations omitted and
R1 being the LM-entailment model.
R1 0 {¬p,¬d,¬f}, {¬p,¬d, f}
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R2
2. {p,¬d,¬f}, {¬p, d, f}, {¬p, d,¬f}, {p, d,¬f}, {p,¬d, f}
1. {p, d, f}, {¬p,¬d, f}
0. {¬p,¬d,¬f}
The LM-entailment model, R1, gives us ¬p and ¬d as tautologies, which
are facts that are read as “You did not park on campus” and “You do not
have a parking disk”. And we see, once again, that PT-entailment blocks
these facts since R2 has valuations which have both p and d being true. A
similar explosion pattern to the previous examples is present even in this
exception scenario, as taking •p as the antecedent allows any consequent to
follow since there is no p-satisfying valuation in R1. The single additional
PT-entailment model, R2, has valuations where p holds and thus blocks this
explosion pattern. While R2 blocks these above derivations, it still allows for
the desirable derivations, by PTL-entailment, of •p ! •f and •p ! •d(one
side of the exception’s double implication with p as the antecedent) from the
knowledge base.
9.4 Conclusion
We reused the representation from the LM-entailment analysis in this chapter
as it uses the same logic language of PTL. We also retained the applicability
of the properties from the LM-entailment analysis, since the LM-entailment
models used in the properties part of that chapter also qualified as PT-
entailment models. When analysing the effectiveness of the PTL-entailment
method, we have seen that applying the PT-entailment method produces
more conservative derivations than LM-entailment. We were unable to per-
form analysis on the paradoxes using PT-entailment since the structure of
the paradoxes prevented us to do so. This resulted in the construction of new
examples which were meant to convey much of the intuition of the paradoxes’
contrary-to-duty readings. We built these examples in such a way as to allow
the introduction of the additional models required to use the PT-entailment
reasoning method. PT-entailment then blocked some unreasonable deriva-
tions that LM-entailment produces for these new contrary-to-duty scenar-
ios. Using the representation from the LM-entailment chapter also meant a




Conclusions And Future Work
This final chapter will firstly summarise the research conducted throughout
the dissertation and concisely outline the results. There will then be a brief
discussion on potential work that can be performed that follows on from the
work done in this dissertation.
10.1 Conclusions
The main goal of this dissertation, as stated in chapter 1, was to analyse how
effective defeasibility and typicality could be within a deontic environment.
In chapter 2, we presented propositional logic which formed the foundation
of the various logic systems that we examined in the dissertation. Chapter
3 dealt with KLM-style defeasible reasoning, which was the chosen logic to
start the deontic analysis. We defined the language of KLM-style defeasible
reasoning and afterwards, the definition of its semantics, which are based
on ranked interpretations, was given. Subsequently, we listed the properties
which define a rational entailment relation. The end of this chapter saw the
detailing of two reasoning methods which could be used during the analy-
sis, rational closure and lexicographic closure. Deontic logic was formally
presented in chapter 4. This started with defining the language of dyadic
standard deontic logic (DSDL) which was the specific deontic logic system of
our choice. The outlining of the DSDL semantics, based on minimal models,
followed and the similarities to the KLM-style ranked interpretations were
drawn. The chapter then saw the presentation of the deontic properties,
as seen throughout the literature, which were deemed to be desirable in a
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deontic setting. This also brought us to the outlining of deontic paradoxes
which frequently occur in the literature. These paradoxes along with the
deontic properties were what we utilised during the analysis. In chapter 5,
we presented propositional typicality logic (PTL) which was the second logic
system to be examined in the analysis. We defined the PTL language as well
as its semantics which also closely resemble that of KLM-style defeasible
reasoning and DSDL. The two reasoning methods of PTL were then given,
LM-entailment and PT-entailment.
Chapter 6 gave the steps taken during the analysis of each logic. This chapter
touched on each of the three analysis stages which dealt with representation,
deontic property satisfiability/applicability and deontic paradox resolution,
respectively. The analysis began in chapter 7 with the KLM approach to
defeasible reasoning. How we represented deontic statements using the KLM
approach’s defeasible implication operator was stated first. We then showed
the deontic properties that are satisfied by the KLM approach while present-
ing an alternative to the Restricted Strengthening of the Antecedent property.
The selection of the lexicographic closure algorithm to conduct the paradox
analysis in favour of the rational closure algorithm was then motivated. We
also detailed the method to detect violations, which made use of the consis-
tency check of the lexicographic closure algorithm. What followed was the
analysis of the paradoxes which showed that the KLM approach was indeed
useful in solving the issues within the paradoxes. From the analysis of the
Fence paradox specifically, a representation for exceptions was still missing
for the KLM approach. Chapter 8 followed a similar pattern to that of chap-
ter 7 except this chapter now dealt with the LM-entailment reasoning method
of PTL. We started with a guide with which to translate deontic statements
into PTL using the PTL bullet operator. Much like with the KLM approach,
our representation method had a similar solution for violation detection by
checking for the existence of knowledge-base-satisfying valuations. The de-
ontic properties were then examined within PTL using our chosen represen-
tation method and the LM-entailment method. We showed, using various
LM-entailment models, that the properties are applicable within PTL. What
followed was the analysis of the paradoxes which showed that LM-entailment
method was also effective in solving the paradoxes’ issues. Chapter 9 was the
last analysis chapter, and it examined the PT-entailment method of PTL.
The method to translate deontic statements into PTL was carried over from
the LM-entailment analysis chapter. The section of the applicability of the
properties was also kept brief as the models used for this analysis would have
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been identical to that of chapter 8. The violation detection method from
chapter 8 was also retained. Since PT-entailment could not provide addi-
tional models for the paradoxes beyond their single LM-entailment model,
we did not check the paradoxes using PT-entailment but rather, new exam-
ples were constructed in order to perform the PT-entailment analysis. The
basis of this analysis is an attempt to observe the differences in derivations
between LM-entailment and PT-entailment. The results showed that PT-
entailment provides better results for the newly made examples. Overall,
it would seem that defeasibility and the stronger notion of typicality can
be effective when used in deontic scenarios, at least when KLM-style defea-
sible reasoning and PTL are used. It is important to note that there are
some drawbacks to these methods which mean these cannot immediately be
taken to be more effective than deontic logic. PTL, for instance, is still only
applicable in specific scenarios and readings such as the one for translat-
ing exceptions, is not the most intuitive. There is a need for further study,
such as assessing more complicated and multi-layered examples, in order to
definitively state where these notions stand regarding deontic logic. However,
the success, when applied to the problematic deontic paradoxes, does bode
well for the applicability of these notions when applied to more normative
reasoning tasks.
10.2 Future Work
There are a few explorable avenues which follow on from different parts of this
research. The first being a method of representing exceptions when using the
language of the KLM approach. A reasonable representation was identified
using the PTL language but one was not so obvious using the KLM approach.
Potentially, one could explore the development of a proof system which shows
which of the deontic properties are generally satisfied within PTL given our
chosen representation. This would go a step further than this research in
which we show that the properties can be applied in particular scenarios
with propositional letters. Given the reasonable success of using typicality in
the deontic setting, it might be a valuable exercise to examine how typicality
could be lifted onto a more expressive logic with the family of description
logics providing potential candidates. With a more expressive language, the
benefits of typicality will be more applicable to a greater number of scenarios
and not just those that fall within the limit of our chosen logic systems’
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expressive power. It may also be of value to study the potential use of
the stronger reading provided by PTL but in a defeasible sense. Concerning
examples such Chisholm’s paradox and the Fence paradox, the study of multi-
level violations and exceptions on this paradoxes respectively, may present
a more significant challenge to the methods presented in this dissertation.
The development of software tools which apply some methods within this
dissertation is also a potential path to go down. Such software could allow
for individuals to examine legal reasoning scenarios with much greater ease
than if they had to conduct the reasoning manually. This would be especially
useful when one has an extensive set of normative reasoning statements that
they wish to analyse.
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